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An adverbial theory of consciousness

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Abstract. Thomas Nagel's criterion for an acceptable theory of conscious awareness, that it address the question of "what it is like" to be a conscious subject has been misunderstood in the light of an implicit act/object model of conscious awareness. Kant's account of conscious experience is an adverbial theory precisely in the sense that it avoids such an act/object interpretation. An "objectualist" and an "actualist" construal of views of conscious awareness are contrasted. The idea of an adverbial theory of conscious experience is further developed by examining recent re-interpretations of Brentano as an adverbial theorist (Thomasson) or as an identity theorist (Hossack). Identity theory is independently criticized as a free standing account of consciousness. Kant's adverbial view is further developed and extended to an account of self-ascription and self-knowledge.

Introduction

One of the key issues in the contemporary debate over the nature of consciousness is whether it is an intrinsic or extrinsic feature of those mental states that are conscious. From a purely diagnostic point of view one can agree with Ryle that an important class of mental states possess what he called a "self-intimating" character (Ryle 1949, p. 34). The question is the extent to which that datum can be preserved in our best reflective account of the nature of consciousness. The aim of this paper is to cast light on that problem via an examination of the prospects for an adverbial theory of conscious experience. There are two basic intuitions motivating an adverbial theory and I will describe them in turn.

The first intuition is that consciousness and mentality are not co-extensive; there are mental states that are conscious and mental states that are not. Furthermore, it seems implausible to explain this difference relationally. If a mental state is conscious, it is difficult to believe that it is so in virtue of relations in which it stands to other states. The first, powerful, intuition is that if I am, for example, standing on the balcony of my apartment, consciously experiencing the view before me, it is difficult to see the consciousness of those states as a relational feature of them. On the other hand, it seems that they are not conscious states solely in virtue of being mental states. The "difference that makes a difference," then, is that I am "in" those states consciously.[1]

The second is, I admit, a more tutored intuition. The second intuition is that the point of an adverbial theory of consciousness must be understood on the basis of an analogy, an analogy with an adverbial theory of perceptual experience.[2] The point of an adverbial theory of perceptual experience was negative: it was to dislodge a competing act/object model of perception. Similarly, the point of an adverbial theory of conscious experience is negative: it is to reject an act/object model of conscious awareness.

These two intuitions come together when one examines the rise and fall in recent philosophy of mind of higher order theories of consciousness, in either their "higher order perception" or "higher order thought" variations. I will not list the large number of criticisms that those theories have attracted (Rowlands 2001, chs. 4 and 5; Siewert 1998, ch. 6; Thomasson 2000, pp. 194–199). I will, however, note that if the intuition that I have described is supportive of the development of a "one level" view of consciousness, that is to be welcomed in view of the severe difficulties facing its major rivals.[3] A higher order perception theory offers a view of consciousness that is both extrinsic and relational, and directly incorporates an act/object model of conscious awareness via its postulation of an inner, perception-like "scanner." (Higher order thought theory, by contrast, is not directly committed to the act/object model, even though it gives an extrinsic and relational explanation of how consciousness is constituted).[4]

My primary focus in this paper will be on the rejection of an act/object model of conscious awareness, although I will also give further reasons why we should not be satisfied with a merely relational theory of the constitution of consciousness. My reason for this focus is that I believe it offers a promising way forward in thinking about consciousness. Rejecting the dominance, in established theories of consciousness, of an act/object model of conscious awareness may seem like a merely negative achievement, but one of the aims of this paper is to show how, nevertheless, it is a very difficult achievement to bring off. I will begin by showing how there is considerable benefit arising from the rejection of an act/object model of conscious awareness if one wants to understand the most famous philosophical claim in this area: Nagel's claim about "what it is like" to be a conscious thinker.

"What It Is Like" and the act/object model

Following Brian Farrell, Nagel argued that consciousness involved there being "something that it is like" to be a conscious mental subject. This claim, as anyone familiar with the literature will know, has generated considerable

controversy. Nagel expressed his intuition this way: "the fact that an organism has conscious experience *at all* means that there is something that it is like to *be* that organism." Articulating this intuition further, he argued that "whatever may be the status of facts about what it is like to be a human being, or a bat, or a Martian, these appear to be facts that embody a particular point of view" (Nagel 1979, pp. 165, 171). This argument has met with a barrage of criticism. The main line of objection is that Nagel is guilty of a generalized sense/reference confusion, which conflates facts about special, perspectival, access to facts with the quite different (and dubiously coherent) idea of a special class of perspectival facts.[5] But building the idea of "special access" into the idea of a fact is, indeed, to miss the very point at issue and goes no way towards solving it (Moore 1997, pp. 50–53; Williams 1978, pp. 295–296). You not only end up with a pretty peculiar set of facts, but you still have your original problem. Nagel's proposal is more than false, it is self-defeating.[6]

However, this popular line of objection to Nagel only follows if his claim is understood in a certain way. I suggest that there is a widespread understanding of the structure of the problem of consciousness in a way that makes Nagel's claim difficult to understand. Robert Brandom has described a dichotomy in contemporary theorizing about the mental, between accounts of our "sapience" and our "sentience." Accounts of the mind which seem plausible when applied to the propositional attitudes do not extend plausibly to sensations; accounts of non-intentional aspects of mind sit uneasily with accounts of rational subjectivity.[7] Nagel's claim has, it seems to me, tacitly been read in the light of this dichotomy, and interpreted as the restricted thesis that "what it is like" applies solely to the objects of perceptual experience.[8] (Even worse, his claim has sometimes been interpreted as applied solely to perceptual appearances.)[9] Basically, on this view, his criterion is met if a mental subject has a qualitative aspect to its perceptual experience. Secondly, and more specifically, his claim has been assimilated to an act/object model of conscious awareness that makes it indefensible, but the fault lies not with Nagel but with that misguided assimilation.

These two points crystallize in any description of Nagel as a "qualia freak." This reductive understanding of Nagel's position takes it that he is committed to a certain view of the character of our perceptual experience, namely, that we are aware in experience of a qualitative aspect to our perceptions over and above their representational properties. Much contemporary work in the philosophy of consciousness takes this view as its target and the prospects for this view in this form look hopeless. But this is a caricature of Nagel's position that one ought to be very reluctant to attribute to him unless it really is unavoidable.

The way to avoid that assimilation is not to incorporate Nagel's criterion into an account of conscious awareness that embodies an act/object model of how such awareness functions. Nagel's view is not properly interpreted as the claim that in our conscious awareness, we are aware of a special class of objects. It is rather that our awareness has a certain adverbial feature, a feature that, when characterised, has to redeem the claim that such an adverbial feature attaches to the conscious experience of a subject such that there is an answer to the question: what is it like to be a subject of that kind? And there need be no restriction of this question, and the relevance of its answer, merely to the contents of perceptual experience. As Charles Siewert has argued, any unprejudiced listing of the phenomena that we call conscious has to include thought as well as perception: conscious phenomena are, at least, silent speech (including auralised utterance) imagery, perception and probably noniconic thought more generally (Siewert 1998, pp. 65–73, ch. 8). Nagel's claim is not restricted to anything less than the perspective of rational subjectivity, and to the question of what the difference is between such a subjectivity when its engagement with the world can be adverbially qualified as conscious, and when it cannot. In this proposal, equal attention has to be paid to the fact of "creature consciousness:" not the least of the embarrassments of the interpretation of Nagel as a "qualia freak" is his explicit statement that a mental state can have a subjective character and not be conscious, as in the case of experiences that are dreamt (Nagel 2002).

I suggest, then, that we retain Nagel's criterion that an account of consciousness should explain "what it is like" to be a conscious mental subject. The way to retain the force of Nagel's point, and to avoid distorting it, is to avoid assimilating it to an act/object model of conscious awareness.[10] As Sydney Shoemaker has pointed out, the great majority of philosophers reject an act/object model of perceptual experience and, as Shoemaker further points out, they should naturally extend this rejection to models of self-knowledge too (Shoemaker 1996b, pp. 3–24). But, in fact, given the popularity of the objection to Nagel's criterion that I have described and attempted to deflect, it seems that it is a model that it is all too tempting to slip back into deploying.

"Objectualist" and "Actualist" understandings of conscious awareness

Focusing on the presupposition of an implicit act/object structure to conscious awareness in this way seems to me preferable to an alternative way of defending Nagel's criterion. This alternative argument does not focus, primarily, on diagnosing an implicit act/object model of conscious awareness in the

reductive interpretations of Nagel's view. Mark Rowlands has argued that conscious awareness of an object has an implicitly dual nature, such that to be conscious of an object is also to be aware that one is in that very state. But this awareness is not, itself, a separable feature of the first order state. One has explained consciousness precisely when one has explained this dual feature:

> Consciousness can be both *object* and *act* of experience. Metaphorically speaking, consciousness can be both the directing of awareness and that upon which experience is directed. Consciousness can include both experiential features *of* which we are aware, and experiential features *with* which we are aware. (Rowlands 2001, p. 122).

There is a great deal here with which I agree, but I believe that we can get to the key point more quickly if we drop talk of an implicit act/object model for conscious awareness.[11] Rowlands retains the model and diagnoses, within it, an ambiguity in how we think of the idea of conscious experience. It is perfectly proper to describe both our conscious experience and its objects as conscious, he argues, but we have two different understandings of what is at issue here that ought not to be run together: Nagel's criterion has been given a reductive caricature in the light of an "objectualist" understanding of the "what it is like" of conscious experience in which its special character is understood in terms of the special character of the objects upon which it is directed. He suggests, instead, an "actualist" understanding in which the idea of "what it is like" characterizes the directing of conscious awareness onto worldly items. In this latter case, so-called phenomenal properties are the vehicle of conscious awareness, which take one transparently to its content: objects and properties in the world.

Rowlands cites as influences on his view the proximal influence of Sartre and the distal influence of Kant, but it seems to me that this is, in fact, clearly a Kantian view. For Kant, self-knowledge is a merely ambiguous notion. One could ask, when one asks about self-knowledge, how one has knowledge of the conditioned, empirically determined contents of one's introspective "inner sense:" how one tells an opthalmologist that one's vision contains light flashes, for example. Alternatively, it could be asked how one knows that one currently perceives a magenta coloured flower. The distinctness of these questions explains the peculiarly elusive character of self-knowledge. Any philosophical account of that which such knowledge consists in seems, persistently, to come up with the wrong kind of answer. Suppose that one focuses on one's self-knowledge, in some particular instance of it, to try and answer the transcendental question of how self-knowledge is possible. This simply takes one, transparently, to the object known. Focusing on my experience of the magenta

coloured flower, it seems that my experience does not stop short of the magenta flower itself. But that is the wrong *kind* of thing – an object located in the world – to play the role of explaining how such self-knowledge is possible. How can a worldly item, indifferent even to our knowledge, explain our self-knowledge that we know of it?

Suppose we shift our attention, in our attempt to answer what Kant would call a transcendental question, to the phenomenal property of magenta in virtue of which we perceive the magenta coloured flower. This simply takes one to the contents of conditioned inner sense (as in one's report to an opthalmologist that one has magenta light flashes). When the magenta phenomenal property is playing the role of an object of my judgement, not its vehicle, that is merely a part of the empirical natural order, an object of conditioned inner sense.[12] Contemporary interest in the philosophy of consciousness which takes the phenomenal properties known mundanely via inner sense, and tries to use those properties to answer the transcendental question of how self-knowledge (and hence consciousness) is possible, is guilty of something akin to a category mistake (Rowlands 2003).

However, Kant also offers us progress on the problems that it seems to me remain after the insights of Rowlands's arguments have been absorbed. It seems to me that there are three problems with Rowlands's view. The first is that he does raise a genuine, transcendental question about how knowledge of the world and self-knowledge are jointly constituted, but does not suggest how that legitimate question might be answered. He merely points out that citing the properties discerned by inner sense not only fails to answer this question, is also seems to misunderstand it. Second, he implicitly deploys an act/object model of conscious awareness, the "directing" of consciousness, without further characterizing that act (if, indeed, it is best viewed as an "act"). Third, in addition to self-knowledge, there is knowledge of self, and following Sydney Shoemaker it seems to me that there is an important connection between rejecting an act/object model of self knowledge and explaining how, in fact, knowledge of the self is possible. Rowlands chooses to retain the act/object terminology and to defuse its misleading connotations: I will suggest that when it comes to the problem of knowledge of self, it is strategically advisable to reject the model itself. I will return to these issues in section 5 after examining an entire tradition of theorizing about consciousness, not prominent in contemporary discussion, which seems to have dispensed with the error of taking conscious awareness to have an implicit act/object structure. Perhaps this tradition will offer a more hospitable context for Nagel's criterion.

Brentano, adverbialism and an identity theory

I have suggested that to make progress even in understanding that which a theory of consciousness tries to achieve, we need to abandon a pre-conception about the structure of the problem and abandon an implicit act/object model of conscious awareness. If we do so, we can understand Nagel's requirement and see that it is a requirement that we ought to meet. Considerable assistance might be forthcoming if we could look to an entire tradition of philosophical thinking about consciousness that seems to have dispensed with the act/object model. That tradition claims Kant as its forebear, Brentano as its classic source, and Sartre as the leading developer and exponent of the view in the twentieth century. This tradition, broadly classifiable as the phenomenological tradition, seems to involve an entire approach to consciousness that never made the mistakes against which I have cautioned.[13] I will focus here on recent re-interpretations of Brentano's work. He was, until recently, usually represented in the literature as a higher order thought theorist and an anticipator of the claim that the consciousness of a mental state is an extrinsic, relational feature of that state. This view has been challenged, indirectly by Keith Hossack, and directly by Amie Thomasson (Hossack 2002, 2003; Thomasson 2000).[14]

They offer competing interpretations of Brentano's account of conscious states and self-knowledge: an identity view and an adverbial view. Hossack's identity theory is primarily developed in relation to Thomas Reid, and primarily directed to sensations not propositional attitudes, but it does suggest the attribution of such a view to Brentano and it is a natural reading of much of Brentano's argument. In this section I will focus, first, on the identity view. It has been explained as follows:

> The Identity Thesis says that each state of which one can be conscious is numerically identical with one's introspective knowledge of the occurrence of that very state. So one's introspective self-knowledge of a mental state is consciousness of that state, which is simply being in the state. (Hossack 2002)

This view has many virtues. It unifies disparate problems about knowledge, self-knowledge and consciousness into one problem. It avoids obvious pitfalls for higher order perception theories of consciousness: it has been objected, for example, that any such higher order perception view requires a qualitative aspect to our experience of our own mental states, the existence of corrigibility in such self-knowledge, that such a view confuses the vehicle and content of knowledge of our mental states, that it ignores the transparency of our self-knowledge and the fact that when asked what we believe, we focus

on the content of our belief and not its vehicle. Hossack's view sidesteps all these objections elegantly as the state that we know we are in *is* the state that is world directed, not the object of some other state which is a "distinct existence."

My objection to a view of this kind is that we can know that we are in a mental state in a "distanced" or alienated way. Two tokens of one type of belief could occur in me in quite distinct ways. I could, for example, believe that a close relative of mine is stealing from the family business. When I first personally believe that, the identity theory seems to describe the case correctly: when I have the belief, I know that I am in it and when I know that I am in it I have that belief. But suppose I would disavow that belief until my therapist explains my behaviour towards this relative in this way: that I subconsciously believe that they are stealing from me but that token belief is so shameful that I have repressed it. Therapy, and my acceptance of the therapeutic process, has "recovered" that belief. I now have another token belief, with the same content, of the same type. It constitutes knowledge of mine, but I am alienated or distanced from it in a particular kind of way. I do not have immediate knowledge of that belief, but knowledge by a complex chain of inference. Intuitively, this seems to be the wrong kind of connection between holding a belief and knowing that one does. Precisely what seems missing here is that one token of a belief type is being consciously judged, while the other token of the same type is not being consciously judged, but the identity theory as explained thus far gives the same account of both cases. So it does not seem to have captured the role that consciousness plays in conscious judgement.

This is not an objection to the identity view as Hossack states it, as he does not believe that beliefs can be conscious: only experiences and actions can. So this objection, I concede, depends on a further point of controversy, namely whether thinking as a whole has any phenomenological features.[15] I think in fact there are good reasons for widening our conception of phenomenology.[16] But even if that point cannot be proved, I could change the example to a subconscious action or experience to stay within the restrictions of the identity view. But the key point about this approach that seems to me very insightful is the connection that it makes between the problem of consciousness and the problem of knowledge, and the insistence that these two apparently distinct problems are intimately connected. I will return to this point in the Conclusion, below.

The second interpretation of Brentano's view that I will analyse attributes an adverbial theory of consciousness to Brentano. As I have defended such a view myself, and as it seems to evade the objection that a conscious state that moves from the conscious to the subconscious loses an intrinsic property or a

property constitutive of its identity, it seems an option worth developing further. Amie Thomasson has defended a view of this kind in her reconstruction of Brentano's arguments. As she interprets Brentano, he oscillated between two basic views. The first is the "dependent aspect" interpretation where, if we are consciously aware that p, we are also aware that we are so aware but this second awareness is, to use scholastic terminology, a "dependent aspect" of the first. There is a "one-level" mental act with two sense of "awareness" implicit in it. However, as Thomasson points out, this retains a vestigial commitment to an act/object model of conscious awareness: it simply postulates it as implicitly contained in every act of awareness. Something like higher order perception theory was right about the nature of the awareness that constitutes self-knowledge, it merely put it in the wrong place. It is, in fact, very hard to see how acts of awareness, modeled on an act/object structure, can be a dependent aspect of a content. It seems to me that if one retains such an act/object model, the self-intimation proposal in this version looks incoherent. It wants the benefits of a first order account of consciousness while illegitimately smuggling in a second order (higher order) view as well. The incoherence lies in the fact that we have an act of awareness that somehow takes two objects: its ostensible intentional object and, somehow, itself.[17]

Rejecting this interpretation, Thomasson develops a different view of her own that is intended to be more genuinely "first order" than Brentano's. She argues that we ought to adopt the idea that a conscious mental state has, as a "dependent aspect," awareness of its content that one is in it. However, we ought to drop the last part of the claim. The act of judging that p, say, can be adverbially modified as conscious or as non-conscious:

> If we take the notion of a mental act seriously, a way that act is might be expressed adverbially, and indeed this is a natural – perhaps the most natural – use of the word 'conscious'. We see, hear, think, etc. consciously. (Thomasson 2000, p. 203)

That leaves open the further question of the difference that the presence of the adverb makes to a mental act, and Thomasson's answer is that such perception is perception "awarely," with a "phenomenological character," such that our experience represents the world as seeming a certain way to us. At the mental state level we are (intransitively) conscious in that our mental states have a phenomenological character, but we are (transitively) aware by means of such states of the nature of other things. But this latter "conscious of" sense is not a sense attaching to the states themselves *such that one is conscious of the fact that one is in them*.[18] Thomasson concedes that there is further explanation required about the nature of self-knowledge: she concedes that there is no longer any sense to the claim that if we are consciously aware that p, we

automatically have self-knowledge that we are in that state. Such self-knowledge is a consequence of conscious awareness, and regularly accompanies it, without this being a definition of that in which a conscious state consists.

Having previously defended a view of this kind as an interpretation of Kant's views, not Brentano's, I am very sympathetic to Thomasson's project. I agree entirely that a more consistent view ought to be developed out of Brentano's work that rejects an act/object model of conscious awareness entirely, both at the level of an individual state and at the level of creature consciousness. I also agree that it is fruitful to separate out the intransitive way in which a mental state has phenomenological character and the transitive way in which an entire organism is consciously aware of the world. But more has to be said about how those two features come together, such that states that are dreamt are not conscious but ordinary perceptual experience is, for example. What difference does it make to an organism as a whole that the states attributable to it are states that it is in consciously?

My provisional conclusions are that there are problems besetting both the identity view and the different interpretations of Brentano's position that Thomasson defends. However, both accounts offer insights that any positive model of consciousness and self-knowledge have to retain. The first is the importance, in any adverbial view, of clearly rejecting an implicit act/object model of conscious awareness (as both Hossack and Thomasson do). Secondly, we need clearly to separate out how a whole organism is (transitively) conscious of the world and how it does so via the intransitive consciousness of its mental states. I now turn to a description of a view of conscious awareness which meets the desiderata elicited from the discussion so far. In section 4 I will describe such a view of consciousness and in section 5 an associated view of self-knowledge.

Kant's adverbial view of consciousness

I have argued that Nagel's criterion can be given a defensible interpretation. Departing from the stereotypical representation of him as a "qualia freak" allows some of the necessary complexities of the issue to be brought into play. We apply the term "conscious" both as a person level predicate applied to whole people or other animals and to states of such organisms: the relation between "creature consciousness" and "state consciousness" is not, itself, a straightforward one. O'Shaughnessy's careful reflections on "conscious" as a person level predicate already make a substantial and insightful philosophical point (O'Shaughnessy 1991, pp. 135–177). The "logic" of the term, ap-

plied to a person, is that being conscious stands to being asleep or anaesthetized as being yellow stands to being red. This suggests that the proper relation here is of determinable to determinates: "state of consciousness" picks out a determinable, of which conscious, asleep, anaesthetized are determinates. For each of the determinates, it is essential to them that they are not each other. But they are functioning as contraries, not contradictories: if you know that I am not (person level) conscious, you do not know whether that is because I am asleep or anaesthetized.

O'Shaughnessy contrasts his approach with those of qualia based analyses of consciousness (in his terminology, those focused on "the experience") and those based on explaining how consciousness differs from mentality in general (in his terminology "the psychological"). He notes, quite correctly, that we can have experiences with a phenomenal character, answerable to the question of what it is like to have them, when we are not conscious but asleep and dreaming and as I have noted, on that point he and Nagel are fully in agreement. You get a more illuminating account of what consciousness is by contrasting it with deprivations of consciousness in a mental subject, than by contrasting it with mentality as a whole. While there is undoubtedly illumination in considering the question why a mental subject need also be creature conscious, for creatures that are creature conscious there is a further, equally interesting question, of how being creature conscious has various modes in which consciousness is present or not.

The mind is, ontologically, a bundle of capacities and the challenge for a theory of consciousness is to explain what "the difference that makes a difference" is when that bundle of capacities is informed by consciousness. The person level account and the state level account have to be developed in tandem: as O'Shaughnessy puts it, consciousness is a "system that underpins a system," it is both "everywhere and nowhere." At the level of a whole person or organism, consciousness is "everywhere" in that it underpins distinctive aspects of mental functioning, but it can seem to be "nowhere" if one's focus is on picking out a special class of properties that are intrinsically conscious, or on the distinctive aspects of some mental states as opposed to others. A correct account of what consciousness is will capture both its global role in organizing the mental powers of an organism as a whole, and how this role interfaces with the idea of consciousness at the level of individual mental states.

As I have previously argued, our best prospects for a defensible view here lie in an examination of Kant's theory of mind, provided that this theory is not understood as beginning from the idea that all consciousness is self-consciousness (on the grounds that a theory of that kind is not going to take us very far in explaining consciousness). Kant's approach to the mind meets the

desiderata that I have elicited from a consideration of Brentano's account of consciousness: that there is an intimate connection between explaining how objective knowledge is possible and the nature of conscious experience, but in both cases we have to avoid an act/object model of either knowledge or conscious awareness. The connection between creature consciousness and state consciousness is an important part of explaining the sense in which an organism can be in a mental state consciously: consciousness plays a dual role both in characterizing (intransitive) state consciousness and (transitive) creature consciousness.

We can retain Nagel's criterion and take it as central to an account of consciousness that there is a question of "what it is like" to be a conscious subject. At the level of the whole subject, we implicitly define what it is to be a conscious subject by considering the role that consciousness plays in the global mental economy of the agent, where it seems to contribute to the co-ordination and focusing of the rational powers of the agent.[19] The conscious subject is perceptually open to the world and directs its attention primarily to the objects of its experience. It is a mistake either radically to detach an account of creature consciousness from an account of state consciousness, or to reify the contents of perceptual awareness so that the "what it is like" of conscious awareness is explained via its direction upon a special class of properties.

As I interpret him, Kant gives an account of four distinct phenomena involved in conscious experience: inner sense, apperception, self-ascription and self-consciousness. His achievement partly consists in arguing that these four phenomena are, indeed, distinct. The starting point of his account of the mind is knowledge; he is, indeed, only concerned with the mind in so far as an account of our distinctive mental powers needs to be drawn upon to explain the nature of objective knowledge. To be a truth apt candidate for knowledge, a mental state must be synthesized, both below the level of a whole judgement in concepts, and at the level of judgements oriented to truth and falsity as a whole. This spontaneous "activity" of synthesis produces a representation of an objective world and in doing so shows why the mental life of a conscious mental subject is unified in the way that it is.

By contrast to the identity view, and the dependent aspect view, it seems to me that Kant is developing a weak supervenience view: if a mental subject is in a conscious mental state intentionally directed towards a proposition, such as a belief, then such a mental subject can "self token" that state in the way that the identity theory describes. But the content of that self knowledge supervenes on a functioning, global, set of mental capacities, centrally the capacity for rationality and is thus not identical to the state thus self-ascribed.[20] My particular interest, then, in exploiting Kant's work is in giving an account

of globally supported self-ascription. In explaining the difference that consciousness makes to the mental life of a subject, it seems in one important respect to make that difference globally. If consciousness is distinct from mentality, and mentality in general consists in a bundle of distinct capacities of mind, what does the attribution of consciousness imply for that bundle? The answer, I have suggested, lies in analyzing the role that consciousness plays as it assists a mental subject in globally making rational sense of its environment.

It is the global nature of the support for this self-ascription that seems to me to be important, and in two ways. Knowledge of one's self, in Kant, is correlative with the conception of oneself as embedded in an objective world not of one's own making. Briefly, our experience has a perspectival character that points beyond itself to the "vanishing point" that is the non-perspectival ground that makes all these perspectival experiences experiences *for me*. As I have argued elsewhere, to articulate the distinctive nature of this self knowledge we need to appeal to the saying/showing distinction.[21] That distinction can be of help when we face a cognitive limitation, which in the present case is the limitation that from within our conscious experience of the world, we cannot say that we are the subject of that experience. We can, Kant argued, append the "I think" to each of our representations, but that fact does not, it seems, capture the unity of the self. But what does do so is the fact that, for any experience of mine, I can append the "I think" to it, thus showing a truth by the exercise of a capacity for self-ascription that I cannot "say."

Kant's central insight is to explain why this account of the unity of consciousness is not circular. It *looks* circular: it looks as if the explanation of the unity of consciousness depends on a capacity for self-consciousness. But however one explains self-consciousness, it clearly presupposes an account of consciousness. Furthermore, if self-consciousness is going to explain the unity of our conscious mental life, it is only going to do so by making the question begging assumption that one and the same self is indeed self-conscious of all "its" states, which is the very point at issue.

Kant avoids this charge of circularity in two ways. First, he implicitly reiterates the point that neither self-conscious thought, nor conscious thought, needs an act/object model of its structure. We do not recognize ourselves in thought: reference, in such a case, is misleadingly viewed as an act that could fail to take the correct object and for that reason it is misleadingly viewed as having an implicit act/object structure at all. Second, he makes an important distinction of scope. Self-conscious thoughts are, after all, themselves conscious. For the purposes of explaining the unity of our conscious mental lives, the explanandum is the totality of our conscious states, including our self-

conscious thoughts. It is *that* which is explained by our capacity to self-ascribe our mental states. Self-ascription is thus distinct from self-consciousness, in that the former has wider scope than the latter. For the purposes of explaining our conscious mental life, all our conscious mental states are subject to our capacity for self-ascription. Self-ascriptive thought is thus a wider category than that of self-conscious thought about ourselves. That leaves open the possibility of treating self-conscious thinking about ourselves in a deflationary way, which acknowledges the fundamental point that self-conscious thinking ought not to be modeled as possessing an implicitly act/object structure. Kant combines a first order or "adverbial" theory of consciousness with a dispositional account of our capacity for self-ascription, which in turn explains the unity of our conscious mental life.

Perhaps because of its focus on language, recent analytic philosophy of mind has, on the contrary, placed a great deal of focus on self-conscious thinking in its linguistic guise. It has done so by being primarily concerned with the form of thoughts about oneself that explicitly deploy the first person pronoun in de se self-ascriptions. From this perspective, Kant's account of the relations between the unity of consciousness, self-ascription and self-consciousness is going to be deeply unsatisfactory. Because it seems as if we face nothing less than a paradox in this area: the paradox that thought about oneself requires linguistic mastery of the first person pronoun, but such mastery already requires a capacity for self-conscious thinking (Bermúdez 1998, chs. 1, 2 and 10). It seems to me that this is not a paradox, but the claim that two of our capacities are interconnected in a form typical of a local holism of interdependent capacities (Thomas, 2003). Kant addresses at least one concern, namely, how these capacities could arise together, by giving an explanation, at the level of thought, of our capacity for self-ascription. A conscious mental subject can deploy a supervenient concept of the self, supervenient, that is, on global properties of a conscious subject. Centrally important among these is the subject's capacities for rationality. That connection between the concept of a self and the concept of rationality is a fruitful further source of misunderstanding of Kant's proposals: as I shall describe in the next section, many philosophers have argued that rationality itself brings in its train a commitment to viewing a rational subject as self-conscious. If that is true, Kant's arguments have got us nowhere. But it is not true, and on any sensible view we need to draw a distinction between normatively governed mental states that are guided by reason and the quite different idea of reflexive control by reason.

I suggest, then, that the overall strategy Kant follows remains defensible. A central datum about the conscious mind, that it possesses a distinctive kind

of unity, can be preserved by giving an account of self-ascription. This capacity for self-ascription is distinct from self-consciousness. For the purposes of explaining the unity of consciousness, self-conscious thoughts are simply a sub-class of conscious thoughts. Self-ascription is explained by Kant as arising from a subject's global mental capacities and that explanation, at the level of thought, makes tractable the problem of explaining the interlocked capacity of how a whole person grasps the capacity linguistically to express sentences involving the use of "I."

An account of this kind, which begins from first order consciousness, is faced, as Thomasson admitted, with the difficult problem of self-knowledge, the subject of much recent analysis. Self-knowledge remains problematic given the implausibility of the identity view, but then a first order theory of consciousness need not be in the business of taking any form of intentional self-directedness of mental states to be a constitutive account of that which consciousness consists in.[22] But it seems to me that a distinction between self-ascription and self-consciousness might help with that very difficult problem. In my final section I will develop a Kantian view of that which such self-knowledge consists in and compare Kant's solution to the similar diagnosis of the problem of self-knowledge developed by Shoemaker.

Consciousness and self-knowledge

The view of the weakly supervenient self that I have described brings out how close Kant's view is to the supervenience view of self-knowledge associated with Sydney Shoemaker. Shoemaker claims that if a functionalistically describable mental subject instantiates a mental content, then given that the subject is rational, self-knowledge that one is in a state with that content supervenes on that instantiation. On this "no reasons" view of self-knowledge, it is part of how the functional role of belief is specified that a person who has a first order belief will self-ascribe it, and that is a definitional requirement. The underlying epistemology of this approach is reliabilist: self-ascription depends on the operations of reliable sub-personal mechanisms.

While this view is attractive it does not seem to me fully satisfactory. That is because, as it stands, at least one of Shoemaker's arguments for it seem to contain a tacit circularity. To make plausible the claim that a functionalistically describable subject cannot be "self-blind" to its self-tokening of a content, Shoemaker appeals to the rationality of that subject. But he then explains rationality in terms of a reflexive self-monitoring of that subject's own states. But that seems to me to introduce a hidden circularity into this explanation.

Shoemaker is a very lucid critic of the idea that introspective self-knowledge is analogous to perception, so it would be surprising if he tacitly assumed that the normativity of a rational subject of experience depends on a reflexive self-monitoring of that subject's own states. That seems to build a capacity for self-scanning, of the very kind favoured by introspectionist models of self-knowledge, into the very idea of reason. But that does seem implied by passages like the following:

> The idea is that it is essential to being a rational being that one be sensitive to the contents of one's belief-desire system in such a way as to enable its contents to be revised and updated in the light of new experience. . . Testing and argument construction are voluntary activities which are the results of beliefs and desires which 'rationalise' them. And here the beliefs will include higher order beliefs, beliefs about the contents of one's belief-desire system. (Shoemaker 1996b, p. 240)

I have previously argued that Kant is not committed to a view of consciousness as reducible to normative governance, which is in turn to be explained as reflexive self-monitoring. Versions of the rationality as reflexivity argument have been put forward by Tyler Burge, Christine Korsgaard, John McDowell, Colin McGinn, and Shoemaker and I am aware that my view is very much in the minority. But it certainly seems to me that whatever the plausibility of this view, its proponents can hardly deploy it, as Burge and Shoemaker do, explicitly as a counter-argument to views of self-knowledge as inner perception. The inner perception theorist is told that self-knowledge is not any form of analogue of outer perception, but the supervenience of a higher order state on a first order conscious state, given normal conditions of rationality. But now rationality, it turns out, involves reflexive self-scanning in a way that should give the higher order perception theorist a "tu quoque" or "you too" rebuttal: how can a rejection of higher order perception theory implicitly draw on a reflexive model of rationality?[23]

In my view you avoid this tacit circularity by remaining resolutely committed to the first order and externalist view that an agent that shows sufficient differential response to worldly perceptual stimuli instantiates rational control over its internal states without their being subject to any form of reflexive scanning. The basic point is a very simple one, and goes back to Lewis Carroll: an implementation of a rational process cannot, on pain of circularity, be implemented *via* its explicit representation in that very same process.[24] To implement rationality in this first order and externalist way is part of the account of what it is to be a conscious subject: to be a conscious subject with self-knowledge is to have the additional feature that Kant described: for any of one's representations, to have the capacity to attach the "I think" to any of

them. Because of the cognitive limitations of the perspective of consciousness, that is, however, a truth that can only be shown and not said.

Christopher Peacocke has argued that Shoemaker's account of self-knowledge should be rejected on the grounds that it is, strictly speaking, a "no reasons" account of self-ascription. The epistemology underlying Shoemaker's model is that of reliabilism and the account does not, in fact, allow for the apparent explanandum: that at the personal level, self-ascriptions of belief give reasons for their own self-ascription in their own right. The epistemic credentials of these self-ascriptions do not rest on the operation of sub-personal mechanisms. I agree with Peacocke on this point and the argument presented in this paper is intended to be a person-level account of this kind. I also agree with Peacocke that developing this sort of view can still truly be described as a supervenience view of self-knowledge: that general description picks out both Shoemaker's view, Peacocke's person-level alternative and, further, the view presented here.

Peacocke's own view, to which I am very sympathetic, is that the consciousness of the mental states in consciously based self-ascription figures in an explanation of how such self-ascriptions are justified. This is another reason for taking it that availability to further thought cannot be what, in turn, explains consciousness. Connecting that point, as I do, with Kant's discussion at *Critique of Pure Reason* B131 that "it must be possible for the 'I think' to accompany all my representations, for otherwise. . .the representation. . .would be nothing to me" Peacocke points out how this requirement that the reasons grounding self-ascription must be conscious connects up with the requirement that the conscious subject have a "point of view" on the world.[25] Peacocke's limited aim is not to explain consciousness, but to assume the idea of a conscious belief and then explain self-ascription. My wider aim, which once again draws on Kant, is to take that idea of a subject's point of view on the world and use it both to explain how one might defend the idea of the unity of consciousness and to give an account of how the capacity for self-ascription arises from the more fundamental idea of the subject's making global rational sense of his or her environment. This overall project is further helped by getting clear on the difference, from Kant's perspective, between self-conscious thoughts and our general capacity for self-ascription.[26]

My view is this: a first order, rational mental subject has a certain capacity, that supervenes on its first order capacities. That is the capacity to self-ascribe its mental states. That capacity is fully conceptual: it does not operate solely at the level of sub-personal mechanisms, even if such mechanisms underly it. This account is based on a first order theory of consciousness which, modulo the account given of the rationality of the subject and its capacity globally to

represent an objective world, gives a theory of self-ascription that explains the unity of consciousness. It contrasts markedly with other recent views in the literature indebted (even at some remove) from Kant's work where self-consciousness is not explained in terms of consciousness, but in terms of the sub-personal mechanisms that explain consciousness (Bermúdez 1998). That is, to my mind, a large and unmotivated leap. If self-consciousness is distinct from consciousness, and indeed a far more demanding achievement on the part of a mental subject than first order consciousness, why is it to be explained not in terms of capacities that supervene on first order consciousness, but in terms of capacities that supervene on the sub-personal mechanisms underlying consciousness?

If you are not troubled, as I am not for the reasons I have given, by the alleged "paradoxicality" of explaning self-consciousness, then it seems clear that the explanatory base from which one ought to work in explaining self-consciousness is first order consciousness, not the sub-personal mechanisms that underlie it (Thomas 2003). I am free to make this plausible assumption because I do not believe that Kant *begins* from the thought that all consciousness is implicitly self-conscious. That is why, in explaining how on a basis of first order consciousness and rationality we can have knowledge of a supervenient capacity for self-ascription, it remains an account at the personal level. The idea that self-consciousness is not to be explained, first and foremost, by consciousness at the personal level seems to me to be very implausible and Kant does not, in my view, hold a view of this kind. I conclude that we can develop from Kant both a first order theory of consciousness and a natural extension of his views to give an account of self-knowledge. Furthermore, we can cast further light on the distinction between self-ascription and self-consciousness. Kant keeps distinct the role that conscious thought plays in explaining the unity of our mental lives, the contents of inner sense and a transcendental insight into how we jointly constitute the world as an objective reality and are given knowledge of a supervenient self. But this account is only going to be fully explanatory if we detach Kant's claims from any view which takes him to be assuming, at the outset, that conscious awareness is tacitly self-conscious.

Conclusion

I have suggested that while Kant's view of self-knowledge seems similar to that of Sydney Shoemaker, his view of consciously based self-ascriptions is in many ways importantly different. I would like to conclude by focusing on one way in which the accounts differ, in order to agree with Hossack's claim

that there is an intimate connection between the problem of consciousness and the problem of knowledge.

Kant was not primarily interested in the mind, but in our mental powers in so far as they are involved in the justification of our objective knowledge of the world. Why, then, is his work of such relevance to contemporary research on consciousness? Because of the happy accident that minds are those things in the world, unlike thermometers and earthworms, that can know. Kant is primarily concerned with cognitive consciousness oriented to truth, hence with truth apt judgements. This places knowledge squarely at the center of the problem of consciousness (so, as Hossack notes, we would be lucky if we faced only one "hard problem" in this area given that defining knowledge is as difficult as defining consciousness).

An important point of difference between Kant's and Shoemaker's models of self-knowledge is that Shoemaker's approach to this particular question is part of a general project of integrating a theory of self-knowledge into a functionalist theory of mind that tries to eschew talk of knowledge per se. As Hossack puts it:

> Shoemaker's partial identity relates pain and belief, not pain and knowledge. To go any further in the direction of the identity thesis would require functionalism to make explicit theoretical room for knowledge itself. (Hossack 2002, p. 180).

The problem that Hossack has identified here is excessive ambition on the part of functionalism. Explanation is not reduction and Kant shows how taking a capacity for knowledge to be centrally definitive of a mind offers an illuminating account of consciousness and the self. Conversely, as Hossack points out, any account of knowledge can hardly ignore the "hard" problem of consciousness. But considerable progress can be made in explaining how those two phenomena relate to each other in a way that is explanatory without being reductive. Certainly, any more ambitious project could only be developed on the basis of a more modest account that elicited the relationship between knowledge and mind. But we are so far away from even that more modest ambition that aiming for a reductionist approach to either knowledge or consciousness represents a misplaced utopianism in current approaches to the nature of cognitive consciousness.[27]

Notes

1. As William Lycan (1997, p. 759) has pointed out, it is most natural to think of consciousness in adverbial terms. He offers a terminological speculation as to why the difference, in his terms, between "states we are aware of being in and states that we are not aware

of being in" is marked by our use of the term "conscious." Lycan suggests that: "we begin with the adverbial form, as in 'consciously thought' or 'consciously felt' and when we make the verb into a noun, the adverb automatically becomes an adjective."

2. Let me say at the outset that I do not view an adverbial theory of consciousness as simply the re-naming of an adverbial theory of perception. For reasons that I will describe, contemporary discussion of the nature of consciousness has become fixated on the philosophy of perception, in particular, on the existence of a qualitative aspect to perceptual experience over and above its representational character. I will give reasons for resisting this narrowing of focus. Therefore, I do take an adverbial theory of consciousness to be a view about consciousness, not merely perception. The two views are analogous, but it follows from that point that they are distinct and not identical. So even if one has good arguments against an adverbial theory of perception you have not (yet) refuted an adverbial theory of consciousness, unless you can develop an analogous refutation for the view that consciousness is a mode in which one can occupy a mental state. For a paper which, it seems to me, mistakenly treats adverbialism about conscious awareness and adverbialism about perception as one and the same view, see Buchvarov (1980).
3. Thomasson (2000, p. 190) characterizes a "one level" theory of consciousness as a theory in which consciousness is an intrinsic feature of those mental states that have it: an adverbial theory does, in fact, try and finesse that issue. To be in a mental state is to be in a mental state consciously, which is a way of being in that state that is not intrinsic to it. That offers a little more scope for steering between the uncomfortable horns of the dilemma between intrinsic and extrinsic views of the nature of state consciousness.
4. Raising objections to higher order thought theory is not, therefore, my primary focus in this paper as it is not committed (directly) to an act/object model of conscious awareness. For some (underdeveloped) objections of mine see Thomas (1997).
5. A view of this kind has been most recently expressed in Michael Thau (2002, pp. 35 – 37). He attempts to bolster the plausibility of attributing this view to "qualia freaks" by adding Ned Block's observation that people often make such a sense/reference slide in describing their experience, for example, "[P]eople who work routinely with graphical representations of sounds. . .often speak of them as if they had the properties of he sounds they represent – for example, being loud or high pitched." But I am not sure that makes the plausibility of qualia freakery as dependent on use/mention confusion any more plausible. (It should be noted that Thau is discussing in this section the "qualia freak" view as a whole and does not, in fact, discuss Nagel's views in particular. I do not know whether Thau would view Nagel as a "qualia freak" in this sense.)
6. This seems to me a preferable line of argument against Nagel than the view which first of all interprets his argument as involving an act/object conception and then refutes it on the ground that a difference in how we pick out mental properties need not have any consequences for the nature of those properties or the identity/non-identity of properties picked out physically/functionally or introspectively. The most sophisticated of such views, presented by Brian Loar, (1997) seems to me to have its own problems. Loar's argument, assumes that introspective knowledge deploys not theoretical but "phenomenal/recognitional" concepts. But we do not recognize our own mental states when we introspect, not even in the case of those states of which we could say that they "immediately trigger" phenomenal concepts "in the having of them."
7. I do not mean to suggest that those who retain this dichotomy are unwitting dupes of our collective weltanschauung as it can certainly be argued for in highly self-conscious and

sophisticated ways, as it is for example, in Brian O'Shaughnessy's (2000). But I do think that positive arguments for this dichotomy can be answered and that it is a dichotomy that we should try and do without. On this general point I agree with John McDowell (1994, lecture one).

8. I should note that Nagel himself is not entirely innocent here, as he has interpreted his requirement in such a way as naturally to introduce a distinction of this kind. As has been pointed out by Naomi Eilan, Nagel insists that from within our ordinary understanding of consciousness it must be possible for us to make sense of other minds in such a way that we preserve the connection between first and third person attributions of mental predicates. But when he extends his arguments to what one could call "mindedness in general", the possibility of radically different forms of mentality, he switches to a "reduced" conception of the criteria for the recognition of mentality in terms of third personal behavioural criteria. This mistake leads him to bifurcate the concepts of mentality into third personal criteria and unavailable first personal essence, a bifurcation which he compensates for by arguing that mental concepts are analogous to theoretical concepts. But now our minds are instances of mentality in general, and as such instantiations this bifurcated set of concepts apply to us. I think Eilan demonstrates very insightfully where Nagel's argument goes awry here. But in the present instance, it seems to suggest a picture of behavioural properties as lying near the perceptual surface (that is why we can make sense of animal minds) but the essence of mind as a theorisable essence, embedded away from such a periphery. That, it seems to me, is the sapience versus sentience dichotomy all over again. See Eilan (2001, pp. 163–194).
9. See, for example, the unfortunate series of transitions in the following passage from a well known anthology on the connection between phenomenology and cognitive science: "Clearly, 'what it is like' to be a bat or a human being refers to how things (everything) look to a bat or a human being. In other words it is just a more casual way of talking about what philosophers have technically and more accurately called phenomenality. . . . A phenomenon, in the most original sense of the word, is an appearance and therefore something intrinsically relative. By its very definition an appearance is indeed what something is for something else; it is a being for as opposed to a being in itself, something as apprehended by another entity rather than something as it is independent of its apprehension by another entity," Roy et al. (1999, p. 9). Matthew Ratcliffe pointed out to me that Nagel's unhappy phrase "what it is like" invites this interpretation as being restricted to mere appearances, which is quite clearly not his view as the contrasting terminology of "Subjective and Objective" (1979b) makes clear. See Ratcliffe (2003).
10. Christopher Peacocke (1998, pp. 64–71) makes a careful distinction between an object of thought occupying one's attention and the distinct idea of an object to one's conscious thoughts.
11. My caveat is that Rowlands seems, on occasion, to suggest a Neo-Sartrean theory of consciousness in which all conscious awareness is ubiquitously also self-awareness. This seems to me to be a view beset by paradox: I discuss it further in Thomas (2003).
12. This point can also act as a reminder that for Kant, terms such as "empirical," "transcendental" and "noumenal" are functional categories, picking out roles relative to a given set of epistemic conditions. This particular point calls to mind one of Kant's examples of a noumenon, that is, an object incoherently thought of as independent of, and yet determining, an epistemic condition, namely Hume's "ideas." For an excellent discussion of this point (and others) see Buchdahl (1989).

13. I make this optimistic claim with some caution. There are views of Kant's and Brentano's philosophies of mind which take their central claim about consciousness to be that it is implicitly self-conscious. That seems uncontroversially to be the case when one examines Sartre's work. If one were to add to this claim the further thought that conscious awareness has an act/object structure, then the views of all three are going to be unhelpfully regressive: consciousness is explained via an implicit act/object awareness that takes itself as its own object. In fact, those sympathetic to what Manfred Frank helpfully calls the "ubiquity view" that consciousness is self-consciousness avoid this regress by postulating a form of "direct awareness" that is "pre-linguistic" or "pre-reflective," Frank (1995, pp. 30–50). In this paper I will continue my defence of the view that Kant has a "one-level" theory of consciousness and assess claims that Brentano does, too, but I see no way of extending this claim to Sartre.
14. I will not assess either view as historical claims, but as theses about the nature of consciousness and self-knowledge to be defended in contemporary terms. (Optimistically, these two dimensions of assessment may not be distinct).
15. Interestingly, as Thomasson points out, Brentano actually spends most of his discussion arguing against the idea that there can be unconscious mental states. That is because he seems to have collapsed the twin ideas of state consciousness and state intentionality into one idea. On my view subconscious states can have indirect intentional content (although that is an interpreted feature of them), direct intentional content (for example, they make take the form of an image that has content, but not its 'actual' content) but they are not subject to normative control in the way that states that are conscious are.
16. The view that occurrent propositional attitudes can be conscious has been defended in Flanagan (1992, p. 214), Goldman (1993, pp. 15–28, section 8) and Peacocke (1998, pp. 63–98).
17. This is one of my grounds for rejecting one way in which consciousness is treated in the phenomenological tradition, broadly construed, namely as a form of ubiquitous self awareness. See Thomas (2003).
18. See the excellent discussion of this point in Siewert (1998, ch. 6).
19. I take that to be the central claim of O'Shaughnessy (2000).
20. This is how I would distinguish my view from Hossack's identity theory.
21. See Thomas (1997, p. 296) where I explain that I owe the suggestion to Adrian Moore and that the proposal was, to the best of my knowledge, first put forward (in print) by Lear (1984).
22. Siewert puts the point very neatly: "Some vague and faintly plausible claim to the effect that conscious experience is experience we are conscious of (or 'aware of') is assumed or asserted, and then a dubious construction of this is then slipped in unexamined, taking the object of the preposition 'of' to indicate what some mental event is 'directed toward' and taking the claim as a statement of necessary, or necessary and sufficient conditions. In this way we are hustled (or hustle ourselves) into supposing that there is something obvious or intuitively compelling about the notion that consciousness is some sort of higher order mental-ness, or self representation, or 'inner scanning'" (1998, p. 197).
23. Shoemaker might respond that just as there is a view of self-knowledge in which we have knowledge of the self that does not involve inner perception, so there is a parallel view of the involvement of the self in rationality that does not involve reflexive inner perception either. But circular arguments, while perfectly valid, are not in the least bit rhetori-

cally persuasive. Shoemaker cannot appeal to a model of self-knowledge that he is trying to establish, as opposed to introspectionist models, by presupposing the truth of the very view that he is trying to establish.

24. Suppose you have a thinker who thinks "p" and "if p then q" but whose mind cannot be moved to draw the conclusion "q". What could make their mind move to this conclusion? I am sure that is a very bad question, but here is an equally bad answer: what makes their mind move is the introduction of yet another first order representation of the required rule, namely "if p then q, and p, then q". Dodgson (Carroll) (1885) pointed out that this simply launches an infinite regress.
25. Peacocke writes, "The requirement that a reason giving state is one which is, or could become, conscious is intimately related to our conception of an agent as someone with a point of view, one whose rational actions make sense to the subject himself (and not just to other experts) given that point of view. For an alleged reason-giving state which could not even become conscious, this condition would not be met," (1998, p. 96).
26. By contrast, Peacocke's account is merely agnostic on the point of whether there is a worthwhile distinction to be made between self-ascription and self-consciousness: but then his aim is not to define consciousness but to explain self-ascription. But his point is that the latter task shows that self-ascription presupposes consciousness and cannot therefore explain it.
27. This paper was first presented to the conference, Consciousness from a Historical Perspective which I organized at the University of Kent at Canterbury, May 16, 2002; an abbreviated version of the final sections was presented to the ASSC-6 conference, Consciousness and Language, Barcelona, May 31–June 3, 2002. The longer version was also presented to the philosophy departments of the Open University and the University of Cork. I am very grateful for the comments of José Luis Bermúdez, Vittorio Buffaci, Sean Crawford, Edward Harcourt, Keith Hossack, Matthew Ratcliffe, Dawn Phillips, Caroline Price, Mark Rowlands, Susan Stuart, Julia Tanney, and Amie Thomasson. Special thanks, for comments on all the versions of this paper, to Kathryn Brown. Research for both of the papers that have been combined here was funded by the Arts and Humanities Research Board and I wish to express my gratitude to the Board for this support.

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