

# Kant, McDowell and the Theory of Consciousness

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My aims in this paper are fourfold. First, I want to examine an attempt to deploy Kant's work to solve central and pressing contemporary problems in both metaphysics and the philosophy of mind, that of John McDowell in *Mind and World*.<sup>1</sup> While I greatly admire that work, I will be restricted here to criticism, in that I will suggest that it ought to have been more, rather than less, Kantian.<sup>2</sup> My second aim is to trace McDowell's presuppositions to a conception of transcendental idealism he takes over from Strawson and indirectly to put pressure on this conception by showing how the arguments of *Mind and World* would have been strengthened by embracing a formal account of transcendental idealism.<sup>3</sup> Third, I hope to deploy some of the excellent recent scholarship on Kant in order to remedy a central defect of McDowell's position, its conflation of the concept of consciousness required for the normative governance of belief with self-consciousness. My fourth and final aim is the most speculative; to suggest that if Kant's account of apperceptive consciousness is properly understood, it could yield interesting results in the contemporary debate over the nature of phenomenal consciousness.<sup>4</sup>

## I

McDowell's theory is set out in the greatest detail in *Mind and World*, although other of his recent published works are directly relevant to its central argument.<sup>5</sup> The focus of *Mind and World* is on perceptual experience and the idea of empirical content. Its central thought is that the essential normativity of the operations of mind are best expressed, in the philosophical tradition, by Kant's concept of spontaneity. McDowell explicates this latter idea via Sellars' metaphor of the space of reasons; spontaneity is to be explained via the inherent normativity of conceptual thought. With this identification in place, McDowell develops Sellars' critique of 'the Given' in perception, with the aim of overcoming the dualism of scheme and content. The focus of the argument is on the inseparability of the contributions of spontaneity and receptivity in empirical judgement. These cannot be factored out into the impingement onto the realm of spontaneity, the space of reasons, of a separable realm of passivity, 'the Given' in experience. The genuine sense in which experience is passive, a constraint on the responsible exercise of rational norms, is a sense that can be represented from within the acceptable theory of empirical experience McDowell recommends.

The position developed up to this point is highly congenial to the Kantian.

McDowell has found a way of explicating the vitally important concept of spontaneity and via a selective combination of themes from Frege and the *Tractatus* has suggested an innovative way of explaining Kant's doctrine that his philosophy is essentially one of form, and furthermore does so in a way that does not entail a suspect psychologism. Unfortunately, McDowell is debarred from acknowledging the extent to which he has set out a defensible version of transcendental idealism because of his conception of what such a doctrine involves. He has taken over this conception from Strawson and the way in which this distorts the arguments of *Mind and World* has already been discussed, very expertly, by Graham Bird.<sup>6</sup> This paper is not directly about transcendental idealism and I do not wish to add to Bird's critique both of the Strawsonian conception of idealism in general, and of its role in *Mind and World* in particular.<sup>7</sup>

My focus will be on the two problems that are the most troublesome in McDowell's account: his connected errors of conflating consciousness with self-consciousness and his failure to distinguish apperception from inner sense in Kant's account of self-knowledge. My aim is to use Kant's views on self-knowledge to make some progress on these two problems.

McDowell's equation of consciousness with self-consciousness could be traced to Strawson, but it is independently motivated by McDowell's extremely demanding account of concept possession and exercise, an account which introduces a sharp discontinuity between persons and other rational animals. McDowell identifies the 'space of reasons' with the realm of responsible, critical freedom.<sup>8</sup> As McDowell interprets this latter idea, it involves the permanent possibility of challenge and revision to one's judgements and concepts. And this, McDowell concludes, introduces the need for self-consciousness. The self must be able to take its judgements and concepts as objects of judgement in order to guarantee the normative governance of beliefs.

The identification of the operations of synthesis with the normativity of conceptual thought is one of the central achievements of *Mind and World*, but if this Kantian claim has the corollaries for concept possession that McDowell implies it is quickly going to find itself in trouble. Connecting normativity with a requirement for critical reflection which is self-conscious in so strong a sense, one which prevents higher animals being rational, seems misguided. However, I will suggest that McDowell is here representative in his conflation of the *reflexive* nature of self-consciousness with the *reflective* nature of apperceptive consciousness, and that Kant holds an 'adverbial' theory of what it is to be in a conscious state that offers a way of avoiding this element of McDowell's theory. We are free to embrace its insightful connection of spontaneity with normativity, via the conceptual, without following McDowell's account of concept possession.

The conflation of the reflective character of conscious apperceptive thought with the reflexive character of self-conscious thought is indefensible for at least two reasons: it commits McDowell to a regressive act-object model of consciousness and causes him unnecessary difficulties over the nature of animal consciousness. The problem with identifying consciousness with self-consciousness is that it either fails to make progress on the problems of explicating the character of

consciousness, or just duplicates the problem. Either the theory takes a concept of first order consciousness as given and just explains self-consciousness as consciousness applied reflexively to itself, or we are to take the very idea of reflexivity as itself the essence of consciousness, as in 'higher order' theories of thought. These will be my explicit focus in my final section, so I will not further discuss their reductive approach to consciousness at this point. McDowell's representative conflation ignores the resources of a Kantian account which begins with a theory of first order consciousness, articulates its formal features and on this basis takes self-consciousness as the more complex achievement it surely is. This multi-stage approach avoids being either regressive or reductive in the account it offers of consciousness.

Second, as Putnam has pointed out, McDowell is forced into introducing a sharp discontinuity between human and animal mental subjects and converts a difference of degree into a difference of kind:

McDowell mars an otherwise fine defence of direct-realist views of perception by suggesting that animals do not have experiences in the same sense that humans do. What leads McDowell to this – in my view, erroneous – idea is his failure to see that the discriminatory abilities of animals and human concepts lie on a continuum . . . his dependence on Kant's discussion leads him to impose much too high requirements on having both concepts and percepts.<sup>9</sup>

I concur entirely, save for the claim that it is 'dependence on Kant' that has led McDowell astray. Exegetically, Putnam is quite correct that McDowell's account of concept possession involves both self-consciousness and the capacity for critical reflection. Both of these ideas express the common intuition that the mind must be able to reflect on its own operations, by reflexively applying those operations to itself, if it is to enjoy the full normativity which for McDowell is the essence of mentality. However, if you inflate the requirements for mindedness in this way, McDowell's form of natural realism has the ironic consequence that it sharply distinguishes human concept-using creatures from other animals and introduces a discontinuity into nature. A more palatable option is available in the original Kantian material.<sup>10</sup>

In order to substantiate these claims, however, we need a clearer sense of what Kant's views of apperception and inner sense actually were. I will reconstruct his view in order to show how sophisticated it actually was and the resources it offers to an account of the normative governance of belief.

## II

Commentators on Kant's view of the mind face the familiar dilemma of reconciling the critique of rational psychology in the 'Paralogisms' with the appeals to the

nature of the mind that seem to play a central role in the 'Transcendental Deduction of the Categories'. That Kant offers a compelling rejection of the Cartesian conception of the ego is clear, but whether this leaves enough material for the 'Deduction' is far less so. This internal tension between two aspects of Kant's position can yield two results. On the one hand, an emphasis on the 'Paralogisms' argument can lead to the claim that Kant has a purely formal concept of the mind which is formal to the point of emptiness. On the rebound from this view, there is the claim that the account of the mind in the 'Deduction' simply violates Kant's own critical principles, offering us insight into the noumenal self. A third option is preferable, and I will develop Robert Pippin's suggestion that we can have formal knowledge of the self qua 'transcendental' self, that is the self as correlate to the transcendental object in acts of apperceptive judgement that are claims to knowledge.<sup>11</sup> This account is possible because first order conscious experience is inherently reflective, which I explain as an adverbial feature of mental states directed towards truth and falsity. This inherent reflectiveness is the basis of the capacity for self-ascribing states, described as the transcendental unity of apperception, and both of these features of the mind are separable from our capacity for self-consciousness. These three separable features of apperceptive consciousness must all be kept separate from the account of inner sense. The inherent reflectiveness of first order consciousness is sufficient for the normative governance of belief and McDowell is wrong to take self-consciousness to be either necessary or sufficient for this purpose.

Kant frequently refers to the mind in the *Critique*, to the extent that it is possible to reconstruct what Pippin calls Kant's 'official' view of the mind, defined by three claims: a thesis of noumenal ignorance, a thesis of empirical dualism and a thesis of metaphysical neutrality.<sup>12</sup> This trichotomy is threatened by Kant's frequent identification of the essence of mentality with *spontaneity*. Spontaneity is intimately tied to apperception and a central question that arises is the relation between the kind of knowledge of mind derivable from apperceptive consciousness and the knowledge of mind derivable from inner sense.

It is, at the very least, clear that Kant is not guilty of the 'conflation' thesis which runs together consciousness and self-consciousness. Kant's view of apperception is, rather, that 'consciousness itself is inherently even if not explicitly self-conscious'.<sup>13</sup> There are two interpretations of Kant's position in the literature which identify consciousness with self-consciousness, Henrich's 'Fichtean' reading of the 'Deduction' as involving 'formal' knowledge of the identity of the self and Strawson's 'austere' reading which merely turns on the possibility of self-ascribing mental states.<sup>14</sup> The form of self-consciousness which Henrich invokes is certainly not a straightforward act/object model, in that it introduces a Fichtean model of self-positing subjectivity. Nevertheless, I do think that Henrich's position would be rendered more plausible by incorporating an adverbial theory of first order apperceptive consciousness; so amended it seems to me largely correct as a representation of Kant's intentions in the 'Deduction', although this is not the place to pursue this large and complex issue.<sup>15</sup> Strawson's more austere model of self-ascription is the form of 'self-consciousness' most

often invoked in contemporary discussions and is the model that has clearly influenced McDowell, so my subsequent references to 'self-consciousness' will be to this austere model.

Apperception and inner sense have been insufficiently distinguished by commentators.<sup>16</sup> Inner sense is the mind's knowledge of its own operations viewed as features of the phenomenal world. As features of the world known phenomenally, such aspects of our own mind are subject to the very same conditions as knowledge of any other feature of the world; a priori epistemic conditions that make any form of empirical knowledge possible. Kant is here responding to the intuition that given that our knowledge of our own mind is peculiarly transparent, it must escape the conditions which Kant places on empirical knowledge in general. Kant's response is, very straightforwardly, that this is not so; inner sense is just as subject to conditionedness as outer sense. However, there is a place within Kant's overall theory for the 'transparency' intuition, as I shall point out below.

Inner sense is thus quite distinct from apperceptive consciousness. The two crucial features of *apperceptive* consciousness are that it is inherently reflective, but not reflexive, and it is always an adverbial feature of contentful thoughts. As in the case of adverbial theories of perceptual experience, the Kantian proposal steers between the act-object model and a relational model of the relationship between consciousness and its content. Consciousness is a mode of being in a contentful state, rather than a property of that state. On one understanding of the traditional 'mode' terminology, one clearly expressed by Descartes, this is a distinction without a difference, as 'modes' are simply a sub-group of qualities. However, on an alternative understanding of the 'mode' terminology defended by Jonathan Bennett, it introduces the idea of an abstract particular.

The point of the 'mode' proposal is that it expresses the phenomenological truth of the inherent reflectiveness of conscious experience, in such a way that experience is inherently capable of giving us knowledge of the self, but does not explicitly do so. This phenomenological feature of first order perceptual consciousness is the basis of the practical capacity for self-ascription expressed by the transcendental unity of apperception, a practical capacity that is based on, but not reducible to, this inherent reflectiveness. This second order capacity rests on the phenomenological feature of first order consciousness that it is my perceiving *thusly*. If apperception is construed adverbially, as expressing the modification of contents by an act of taking up and thinking through the content, this can be seen as giving an implicit mode of self awareness in which the self is given to itself neither as an object, nor as subject, but as a mode of being in a state directed to the world:<sup>17</sup>

. . . these differences between self-awareness, self-identification and apperception, all rest on a similar claim, what one should call an insistence on the non-isolability of apperception as an event, that apperception cannot be a relation between me and my thoughts that 'occurs' in addition to the causal and/or intentional relation between my thoughts and what they represent . . .<sup>18</sup>

Kant's view of apperception is restricted to 'cognitive consciousness', intentional awareness that things are thus and so, assessable as true or false; apperceptiveness, the implicit application of normativity, is tied to the very possibility of truth/falsity in a judgement.<sup>19</sup> As Pippin notes, apperception is neither empirical self-awareness ('B' Deduction), nor empirical self-identification ('Identity' paralogism).

The crucial difference between apperception and inner sense is that whereas inner sense just gives us the contents of our own minds passively, the activity of apperceptive synthesis thinks the judgement, via its form, in such a way that its internal relation to its truth or falsity make it a mentally asserted judgement, not just a mental occurrence. Pippin puts the point as follows:

I can not only be aware of, say, drums and then a noise produced with them; I can also be aware, from another point of view, of the empirical events which occur in my mind in such awareness . . . But I can also *think together* these events (spontaneously) in thinking that the drums produced the noise . . . This cannot just be a passive awareness of a state or doing of my mind, conceptualised in judgement, since it is a thought made possible by the active understanding in the first place.<sup>20</sup>

This point is at the heart of Kant's position. Take a collection of mental states which are all mine. In what does the unity of this collection consist? One natural response to even the austere Strawsonian 'possibility of self-ascription' view is that explaining this unity via the idea of self-ascription is question begging. The possibility of self-ascription is a consequence of unity and cannot constitute it.<sup>21</sup> This seems to me to miss the point of invoking spontaneity, via apperception, at this point: the invocation is to view each state apperceptively, as both thinking the state as objectively contentful and as introducing the knowing subject adverbially correlated with it.<sup>22</sup> This explains why we are not just dealing with a collection of states which just happen to be mine. They are thought *as* mine, and both aspects of apperceptive consciousness are equally important for Kant. ('Ownership' is not itself the point, as this too can be given an empirical as well as a transcendental reading. I could just inspect the contents of my mind as all contingently collected together in this mental container, via my inner sense.)<sup>23</sup>

With this point made, we can now find a role for the phenomenological finding of 'transparency' which McDowell describes in the following terms:

. . . an unprejudiced phenomenology would find it more accurate to say that the contents of consciousness, when we have occurrent thoughts, are thoughts themselves, on something like Frege's usage for 'thought' . . . senses potentially expressed by assertoric sentences, not vehicles for such senses.<sup>24</sup>

McDowell's target here is the thought that in introspection we are brought up against 'representations' in the content of consciousness that are only extrinsically

representational and driven by the requirements of theory. However, this can now be explained in Kantian terms as the difference between apperceptively thinking through a thought to its internal relation to truth and falsity and viewing the components of the thought, via inner sense, as the phenomenal occurrences lodged in a causal order that they also are, under a different aspect. Again, properly understood Kant's position and McDowell's complement each other.

### III

With these vital distinctions in play, we are now in a position to avoid McDowell's error of identifying normativity with self-consciousness. If he followed Kant's account of apperceptive consciousness more closely, then a theory would emerge which makes the normative governance of conscious belief available to subjects which are not self-conscious in the sense that they can embed their contents within other contents.

The problem stems from a certain looseness in McDowell's co-ordination of the terms 'normative' and 'critical': the space of reasons is identified with the space of responsible freedom. However, while this may be an acceptable point concerning the normativity of whole judgements, it is problematically applied below the level of the whole judgement and yet this is what McDowell's overall theory seems to imply. The credentials not simply of inference rules and whole judgements must be open to scrutiny on his account, but concepts too. This seems to overplay the sense in which the exercise of concepts is normative. A concept can borrow its normative credentials indirectly, from those of whole judgements. The simple application of a concept can, on an occasion, rest on no more than that a concept user finds its application 'primitively compelling'; as Wittgenstein remarked, to apply a concept without reason is not to apply it 'without right'.<sup>25</sup>

McDowell has discussed this problem in previous work, when he first connected his Sellarsian conception of the Myth of the Given to psychological materials in his insightful account of the private language argument.<sup>26</sup> Animals and children, being non- and pre-conceptual, were, it seemed, being denied experiences in any sense at all in McDowell's account which viewed even inner experiences as conceptually structured. McDowell's response to this charge was that he was in no way denying that such subjects undergo sensations; the point is *how* one conceives the relationship between these pre-conceptual structures and the advent of conceptual thought, which McDowell identifies with the advent of language. We are not to see conceptual thought as a more sophisticated achievement of essentially the same kind as the initial laying down of causal structures of response implicated in pre-linguistic sensation experience, as merely the throwing of a conceptual garb over a pre-existent structure, which then persists as the substratum of conceptual thought. The advent of language brings about a transformation of the existing structures.

This is, I am happy to concede, a plausible view. So must I additionally concede that the advent of the conceptual brings the full panoply of self-conscious critical

reflection? No, because there is a third alternative available between seeing pre-conceptual structures as continuing substrata to conceptual thought and seeing the conceptual as equivalent to the self-consciously reflexive. The third option draws on Wittgenstein's account of rule following to illuminate the dictum that to apply a concept without reason is not to apply it without right.

The problem lies with extending McDowell's 'quasi-inferentialist' account of justification all the way down below the level of the whole judgement.<sup>27</sup> To use an analogy, I may have to give a reason for every step of a combination in chess, but I do not have to give a reason for putting a piece on the board in the first place. Game constituting moves, simple applications of concepts, are disanalogous to moves within the game. The problem is that when I characterize such moves as 'primitively compelling', McDowell hears 'primitive' here as a non-normative notion: as ontogenetically prior, a blankly causal contribution to the formation of conceptual capacities. But only *inferential* primitiveness is implied in Wittgenstein's original account, which McDowell has done more than anyone to illuminate for us in his exegetical work on the rule following material. I should add that my proposal on Kant's behalf does not attempt to resurrect the idea of non-conceptual content, as that idea is criticized by McDowell, and is quite independent of any such proposal.

McDowell has been influenced by Sellars' account of concept possession, as opposed to mere differential responses, as involving both holism and the form of normativity implied by rule following. However, there is a third option between rule following and mere regularity and that is 'consciously following' a rule as opposed to 'always consciously applying' a rule.<sup>28</sup> My proposal is that in Kant's view, first order consciousness is both a matter of consciously following without consciously applying a rule, and is sufficient for the normative governance of belief in virtue of its form. In Kant's three stage theory, the apperceptive exercise of concepts in judgement is a form of consciously following a rule in a more primitive exercise of conceptual capacities than conscious rule application. This amount of normative conceptual thought can be attributed to higher primates and other rational animals who one need not view as fully self-conscious.<sup>29</sup> First level apperceptive consciousness suffices for the normative governance of belief without the need to invoke reflexivity. Self-consciousness of course occurs in psychological subjects like us, but it is a more sophisticated achievement than simply possessing and deploying concepts, which requires apperceptive consciousness but not self-consciousness. As John Searle notes, 'In the ordinary sense, self-consciousness is an extremely sophisticated form of sensibility'.<sup>30</sup> Kant's views, then, offer more flexibility than those of McDowell on the issue of the extent to which we can credit concept users with consciousness.

This overall account promises a more satisfactory treatment of animal consciousness than McDowell's. If one turns to McDowell's most explicit treatment of the issue before *Mind and World* it seems that he is, dialectically, forced to agree with me that there is a distinction between conscious experience and self-conscious experience and that the former suffices for normative concept use.<sup>31</sup> Consider McDowell's argument strategy in his critique of the cognitive scientific

model of consciousness offered by Daniel Dennett.<sup>32</sup> McDowell there argues that cognitive science deals solely with sub-personal mechanisms which are the subject of 'as if' attributions of content. The contrast between personal and sub-personal content straddles two distinctions, between persons and non-persons, and animals and parts of animals. The mediation between the level of conscious, contentful experience at the level of the fully minded subject like us and the 'as if' dealings in content of our sub-personal systems cannot be achieved, McDowell argues, by postulating yet another sub-systemic device, Dennett's internal 'public relations' sub-system. In Dennett's overall theory, the role of such a 'public relations' sub-system is to interface between the entire collection of sub-systems and a public language. The simple reason for this is that we want to apply the distinction between animals contentfully embedded in their environment and their sub-systemic parts to an account of animal consciousness, not simply to that of persons. In this wider project it is the whole organism, embedded in its environment, that deals contentfully with the world and this cannot be given Dennett's explanation for the simple reason that in such animals (the case McDowell discusses is frogs) the privileged 'public relations' sub-system is missing.

So far, so good. But as Bilgrami points out in his acute commentary on the debate,

. . . the general reasons one might have for being persuaded that [Dennett's account] is unacceptable as an account of contentful consciousness, would have to be the sort of reasons which would worry us about the framework's ability to handle the normative and reflective elements essential to our description of the phenomena of consciousness. Nothing *short* of such reasons, I believe, should undermine Dennett's framework. But such reasons . . . would also be reasons for denying consciousness to creatures that lacked a great deal of *self*-consciousness and self-critical mentality, such as, say, frogs. However, to take *this* critical stance towards Dennett would be to be just as critical of McDowell's conclusions.<sup>33</sup>

The point, even if *ad hominem*, is surely well taken. If the frog-embedded-in-its-environment is to have content, in order to embarrass Dennett's position, it has to be in an embedded state to which normative appraisal is relevant. Yet the frog is not self-conscious by anyone's lights and in *Mind and World*, normativity is tied to self-consciousness. So the option I have offered to McDowell of a Kantian multi-stage theory in which content, normativity and consciousness are connected at one level, a level shared by those creatures we can see as contentfully embedded in their environments, but self-consciousness is a further 'higher level' achievement, should be welcome in the context of his overall commitments.

However, the advantages I have listed will count for little if the three stage theory I have outlined either violates Kant's own principles or causes more problems than it solves. Pippin's argument is that the conclusions Kant draws are relativized to the subject qua subject of knowledge; it is a 'non-noumenal relativization

of the spontaneity claim to “subject qua possible knowing subject”. This is not equivalent to claiming knowledge of the self as it is in itself and thus does not violate the Metaphysical Neutrality Thesis. However, the transcendental status of these claims is, as Pippin notes, more difficult to explain. Certainly, one is not forced to accept Kant’s occasional identifications of the apperceptive subject with the noumenal self. Pippin suggests that we follow Kant’s successors in the idealist tradition in appreciating the *sui generis* character of transcendental knowledge:

Kant thought that his critical theory had forever destroyed the possibility of *any* ‘purely rational determination of the real’, so he would have obviously resisted the suggestion that his denial that a phenomenal theory could account for the epistemic subject, and his denial that we have any intellectual intuition of a non-phenomenal subject, still left open another possibility for an a priori determination of what a subject of experience really must or could not be. But, again, the argument of his successors was that this was just what his own version of transcendental reflection (later, for them, ‘absolute’ reflection) had done.<sup>34</sup>

The aim of the ‘Deduction’ is to demonstrate that a self which is neither the noumenal nor the phenomenal self, the transcendental self, is active in knowledge of objects, similarly construed as transcendental objects which are neither sensory impressions nor noumena. In both cases the force of the term ‘transcendental’ is solely to focus our attention on the a priori epistemic conditions which must obtain for knowledge to be possible and that necessarily involve the subject’s activity.

This is the point at which I can broach a subject that is much discussed in the literature: what is the conception of the self presented to us in apperceptive consciousness and what is the mechanism of reference by which the self is presented? The key point is that in apperceptive consciousness we have a judgement thought through its form, which expresses how the material of the judgement has been synthesized by a priori synthesis. However, the ‘inherently reflective’ feature of such consciousness is the basis of the more sophisticated capacity of articulating both the content of the judgement and a point of view; as Brook points out, in apperceptive self-ascription we are given both a token reflexive referring device *and* a point of view in such a way that we can determine the reference to the subject qua epistemic subject.<sup>35</sup>

Kant’s account does not, in my view, essentially turn on his holding a theory of direct reference for the first person, as Brook has argued. In Brook’s exegesis of Kant’s theory of self-knowledge, apperceptive consciousness gives us knowledge of the self via such a directly referential mechanism and this proposal on Kant’s behalf seems curiously unmotivated. All we have to work with is the original content, which Brook labels the ‘representational base’ of apperceptive judgement, whereas I have argued that this base is already implicitly capable of giving knowledge of the self. This implicit knowledge is then further articulated by our capacity for self-ascription.

Another merit of the adverbial proposal is that it expresses in grammatical form the rejection of the kind of model of the relation of consciousness to content implied by Brook's model. In Brook's account, the representational base stands alone and we have to work from that to the elusive self which is the grammatical subject to which the representational base stands as object. The only device which can pin down this elusive owner of the content is, it seems, direct reference. The self appears as the owner of the content by figuring in the subject place of an expanded self-ascriptive judgement; but this capacity for self-ascription is unexplained. Contrast the adverbial proposal, in which the content which functions as a representational base is inherently reflective and already gives us an implicit base for self-knowledge, expressed by the way in which the subject is in that contentful state – its 'mode'.

#### IV

I have implicitly accused McDowell's account of the normative governance of conscious belief of involving an infinite regress, via its identification of consciousness with self-consciousness. The account I have offered will hardly represent a gain if it commits the same error, but that is the charge levelled against Kant's account of spontaneity and apperception by Susan Hurley.<sup>36</sup> My aim in this section is to ward off this line of objection and the equally serious charge that the account I have offered is futile, since it does not avoid what Hurley calls the 'just more content' objection. This argument parallels the account of the first person in chapter V of *Mind and World*.

Hurley treats Kant as concerned with 'self-consciousness', of which apperception and inner sense are two variants: an identification which leads her at one point to criticize Kant for conflating self-consciousness and consciousness. However, the reason for this error on Kant's part, claims Hurley, is his identification of apperception with our awareness of the activity of spontaneous synthesis:

Self-consciousness as inner sense, or receptive consciousness of what we passively undergo as we are affected by the play of our own thoughts, is distinguished from self-consciousness as apperception, or consciousness of our activity, of what we are doing, i.e. spontaneously synthesising or unifying.<sup>37</sup>

Hurley goes on to point out that the activity of synthesis is not an object of inner sense. Indeed not, but the objection to the identification in the passage quoted is that apperception is not consciousness of our activity of synthesis, it *is* our activity of synthesis. Were it not, it would simply be another item of knowledge which would presuppose the activity of spontaneous synthesis. Being presupposed by all empirical knowledge, it cannot be an object of it. Hurley is here describing empirical synthesis, which is quite a different form of self-knowledge. With the

different forms of self-knowledge Kant discusses distinguished from each other, Hurley's criticisms can be defused.

Her construal of synthesis allows Hurley to construct an argument against Kant that is very similar to McDowell's account of the first person and worth reconstructing both for its intrinsic interest and for the challenge it poses to the account of apperception I have described. The 'just more content' objection is that judgeable thought contents, if they are the contents of consciousness, cannot characterize the unity of the subject that has those thoughts. Appending the 'I think' to these representations merely generates a further representation. Thus, something outside the contents of thought must be invoked to 'place' or anchor the thought contents so as to capture the unity of the self, such as the bodily ego, in order to block the regress.

Take the two assumptions that we need to go outside the contents of consciousness to explain their unity (the Williams/Strawson 'unity requires objectivity' argument) and that nothing in consciousness can determine such unity (the 'just more content' argument) and we have an impasse resolved by appealing to the nature of apperception.<sup>38</sup> But then apperception, construed as it is by Hurley as consciousness of synthesis, yields a purely formal sense of the 'I think:' not identifiable with the phenomenal self nor with the noumenal self. We have a free floating source for the unity of consciousness, an origin of unity without a 'grounding' or an explanation. Hurley, revealingly, states that this places the self in a 'no man's land', which she further describes as 'between phenomena and noumena'.

This is the basis of both Hurley's and McDowell's criticisms of Kant's account of the first person. Hurley, unlike McDowell, accuses Kant of committing a humuncular fallacy and of presupposing an act of synthesis without an agent. She suggests that we need a third option besides either positing a mysterious act of synthesis without an agent, or positing an agent of synthesis located presumably in the transcendental psychology that Strawson condemns. The third option she suggests is an appeal to sub-personal mechanisms at a lower level of explanation than conscious experience. With the identification of apperception with empirical consciousness of synthesis in place, Hurley is unimpressed by the Kantian solution of appealing to apperception since it obviously does not escape the 'just more content' point. Hurley endorses Walker's claim that at this point we can resile to the strategy of transcendental argument without transcendental idealism and take it that synthesis gives us knowledge of a self which should be exempted from the application of the doctrines of transcendental idealism.<sup>39</sup>

McDowell's argument about the first person follows the same argument strategy. Absent a 'pregnant concept of second nature', Kant's insight into the nature of spontaneity can be expressed only by placing normativity 'outside of nature'. Similarly, his treatment of the first person ends up locating the ego in a 'transcendent' (sic) position. Kant cannot, in McDowell's view, offer a satisfactory account of the relation between self-consciousness and perceptual consciousness. The 'Deduction' seems to connect perceptual consciousness with the self-ascription of conscious states, hence with self-consciousness. But the Paralogisms argue

that the 'I think:' that in McDowell's view expresses self-consciousness is merely picking out a formal point of view – the point of view of subjective consciousness.

This interpretation of the Paralogisms is again Strawsonian; the central idea is taken to be that the flow of consciousness does not involve applying a 'criterion of identity'. McDowell then applies the 'just more content' argument against the adequacy of this view. The formal continuity of a 'geometrical' point of view is not enough to return us to the ordinary concept of a self; for that extra step it is necessary to go outside the subjective flow of consciousness to see the identity of the first- with the third-person. Here McDowell invokes Evans's account of self-identification. Kant could not take this step, 'because he leaves in place the suspect assumption that when we set out to provide for the content of the idea of a persisting self, we may not go outside the flow of "consciousness"'.<sup>40</sup>

Given that the 'just more content' argument looks remarkably like one of the central arguments of the 'Paralogisms' that the unity of consciousness is not consciousness of a unity, it is difficult to see why the argument itself should be taken to pose problems for Kant. Several points can be made on Kant's behalf about his alleged predicament as the target of the 'just more content' argument. First, it is clear that behind both Hurley's and McDowell's interpretations is a Strawsonian conception of both transcendental psychology and transcendental idealism. With this background understanding removed, it is not that one can now acquiesce in the identification of the 'I' of the 'I think:' of synthesis with the noumenal self. Far from it. The point is that 'between phenomena and noumena' is precisely where Kant would locate his formal notion of the self, co-ordinate with the formal notion of the transcendental object '= x'. Just as the transcendental object is neither a noumenon nor an intuition, but rather the notion of an object as subject to the obtaining of the necessary conditions for the knowledge of objects, so the formal 'I' is neither a noumenal nor a phenomenal self. It is the self qua knowing subject, implicated in the thinking of objective (contentful) thoughts.

The alleged 'humuncular fallacy' committed by the account of apperception can be answered by a correct account of the connection between apperception and spontaneity. Apperception involves the spontaneity of synthesis; it is a presupposition of experience of objects and is distinct from inner sense. Reflective awareness of the objects of inner sense is just more conditioned awareness; *it too presupposes apperception*, the capacity to think together the components of thought as a judgement.

In denying the need to break out of the contents of consciousness, viewed in the light of apperceptive spontaneity, to a 'lower' level that invokes underlying cognitive mechanisms to explain the peculiar connectedness of thought inherent to contentful judgement, Kant and McDowell are at one. To think a proposition as an objective proposition, internally related to the possibility of its truth and falsity, is to think it apperceptively. This views under one aspect, the transcendental aspect, one and the same state that we can have second order knowledge of as an object of inner sense. One could, if one so chose, investigate by empirical methods those cognitive methods which underlie the combinatorial structure of thoughts, but one is simply studying the functioning of the object of inner sense,

a material item located in the causal order. Cognitive science is free to investigate such states, but is not doing so under an aspect in which those states are orientated in judgement to truth and falsity and are combined by spontaneous apperception. Such investigations are simply irrelevant to the issue of spontaneity and normativity. I take it McDowell's strictures on taking the explanatory enterprise that invokes non-conceptual content in this connection are making essentially the same point as Kant's.

This leaves the apparently incontrovertible 'just more content' argument, linchpin of several contemporary discussions and on which McDowell and Hurley are in agreement. The way out of the 'just more content' argument, I suggest, is to appeal to the saying/showing distinction as part of the defence of the three stage view I have described.<sup>41</sup> Implicit knowledge of the self is already present in the content of apperceptively unified conscious contents; the articulation of this knowledge is the task of the capacity for self-ascribing 'I think:'. It makes implicit knowledge explicit. Far from being the futile addition of 'just more content', the fact that, for any content of mine, I can append the 'I think:' to it exhibits a truth that cannot, from the perspective of consciousness alone, be stated. It is still true and far from trivially true. One may need to step outside the contents of consciousness to express this truth, rather than exhibit it via what one can do, but once again there is no need, unless one adopts the Strawsonian line on idealism, to see this as involving any more than abstraction from ordinary conditions of selfhood.<sup>42</sup> This capacity for self-ascription of states itself rests on the phenomenological point that apperceptively unified thoughts are inherently reflective; in that sense they contain more than 'just content'.

The Neo-Lockean theory that McDowell erects in the place of this view is wholly anachronistic, introducing an optional agency perspective. The externalism that McDowell introduces from Evans to substantiate the 'unity requires objectivity' argument depends on taking selves essentially to be embodied agents, drawing on their practical capacity to locate their egocentric space within objective space. But this stage of the argument of the *Critique*, the 'Deduction', is addressed to makers of judgements who may possess a sensibility, but may not possess our specific forms of intuition. Their experience may not be spatial or temporal at all. Introducing an externalism that draws on the capacity for spatial representation that we possess is hardly to fill a lacuna in a Kantian argument, since the lacuna itself does not exist.<sup>43</sup>

We do not, as yet, have a self-contained nor wholly sound argument at this stage of the *Critique*, but I take it that this is wholly commensurate with Kant's intentions. The lacuna at the end of the 'Deduction' is that while we have a proof that a numerically identical self is implicated in the making of all my objective judgements we do not yet have an account of the diachronically identical self. Certainly to complete the argument we need to psychologize and temporalize the argument and that is the role of the 'Analytic of Principles'. We can then begin to relate the incomplete argument of the 'Deduction' to our temporalized and embodied subjectivity, but to introduce these themes earlier into Kant's overall argument strategy is simply to overlook its shifting scope at different points of

the argument. Certainly, the essential embodiment of our subjectivity is a claim that Kant prepares the way for, but it was not his direct concern.<sup>44</sup>

## V

The claim I have attributed to Kant is that first order phenomenal consciousness is inherently reflective. This idea has been further explained 'adverbially' to distinguish it from the claim of inherent reflexiveness. How much work can Kant's account of apperception do when applied to contemporary arguments about consciousness? The merit of the adverbial proposal, which treats consciousness as a mode of being in a mental state, is that it dispenses with both 'act' and 'object' in an explanation of consciousness. Turning to contemporary discussions of consciousness, the theory which seems to share the same fundamental motivation is the higher order thought or 'HOT' theory proposed by Rosenthal, amongst others. That theory wants to demystify consciousness by explaining it away in terms of the relations between states which are non-conscious. However, it faces the objection that it eliminates a plausible intuition, which can be theoretically articulated, to the effect that consciousness is an intrinsic property of a state. My suggestion is that an adverbial proposal could make some headway in this dispute since it does not view consciousness as a property of a state at all.<sup>45</sup>

The claim that consciousness is an intrinsic property of a mental state, rather than a relational property, has been powerfully argued in a recent paper by Naomi Eilan. Eilan suggests that phenomenal consciousness essentially involves reflectiveness as an 'intrinsic' rather than 'relational' property of a mental state, as in Rosenthal's account and HOT theories in general. This argument is embedded in a wider approach to consciousness and the first person which I find congenial, although here too I would urge a role for the idea of apperceptive consciousness as distinct from self-consciousness, as a way of evading the anti-nomic structure of the 'just more content' argument. This wider discussion must unfortunately wait for another occasion. My interest lies in the first stage of Eilan's two stage theory, the account of first order phenomenal consciousness. The desiderata Eilan sets out for her theory are as follows:

What we need . . . is . . . an account of the spatial contents of perceptions which shows them to be, simultaneously (a) implicitly self relational in such a way as to give the subject an implicit grip of herself as an object . . . and, (b) of a more basic, primitive kind than conceptual contents, of a kind that shows such primitiveness to be partially constituted by the absence of the detachment needed for substantive self-knowledge.<sup>46</sup>

The account of apperceptive consciousness I have presented on Kant's behalf seems to me to meet desideratum (a), but obviously not (b), for the reasons that McDowell himself urges in his critique of non-conceptual content. However, when it is explained that 'substantive self-knowledge' is for Eilan self-consciousness, it

can be seen how the apperception theory both gives the subject as the focal point of experience while not importing the idea of substantive self-consciousness. It does so from within the standpoint of apperceptive subjectivity, a standpoint which is lost if one moves to the standpoint of inner sense, explained via the idea of the non-conceptual content of an informational system. Eilan objects to first order conscious representations implicitly representing the self as object, on the grounds that this represents 'some sort of category mistake'; but here too McDowell's remarks on how objects can figure in a proposition while remaining within the conceptual offer a preliminary reassurance, while the subject's being presented merely 'adverbially' offers further reassurance on this point.<sup>47</sup>

However, my real interest is in the deep point of agreement between Eilan and the adverbial theory I have outlined. Objecting to the higher order theory, Eilan argues that while its metaphysical motivation is admirable, it fails to accommodate the intuition that first order phenomenal consciousness is essentially perspectival through and through. This is captured in Eilan's two stage theory which begins with first order phenomenal consciousness, explained via the invocation of non-conceptual content and ascends to an account of second order consciousness, which is again taken to be 'intrinsically reflective'.<sup>48</sup>

This theory seems similar to Kant's, but the key difference is that the account of apperceptive consciousness is debarred from invoking non-conceptual content and the subject implicated in apperceptive consciousness, the subject qua knower, is represented within first order perceptual consciousness as that contains both a content and an implicit point of view, expressed by the content's form. The 'second stage' in the Kantian account would be a separable account of self-knowledge as the embedding of the subject's conscious states within explicit self-conscious awareness. However, the account does not attempt to break out of the standpoint of consciousness if that is understood, as it ought to be if the term 'apperceptive' is properly applied, as the standpoint of normativity.

While I agree with Eilan about reflectiveness, I argue that Kant's proposal retains what is attractive about *both* her position and that of the higher order thought theory. Invoking Kant's conception of apperceptive consciousness blocks the regress threatened by any 'higher order' theory like Rosenthal's, but the 'adverbial' proposal I have put forward on Kant's behalf does not make reflectiveness an intrinsic property of such states either. There seem to me to be several reasons why one might want to resist such a move. For example, it seems implausible to argue that a conscious belief that becomes subconscious loses an *intrinsic* property. It is rather a change from one mode of being in the state to another. Secondly, the way in which consciousness is a function of content is explained in the apperceptive account; it is a function of form. Once again, one could argue that when a content passes into subconsciousness it is merely a collection of events no longer thought through its form by apperceptive consciousness.<sup>49</sup>

Now the theory I have presented on Kant's behalf is not going to please the HOT theorist, for whom it is insufficiently explanatory. My response would be that to explain is not to reduce and that while Kant's theory does contain an ineliminable theoretical use of the term 'conscious', the adverbial character of its

use illustrates that the theory has no need for special acts or privileged inner objects. Relativized to conscious judgements which are objective, the claim is that reflectiveness is neither an intrinsic nor an extrinsic relational property of the state but a function of the state's role in the knowledge system of the subject. This system, however, cannot be mapped on to a functionalist system of states defined in terms of causal roles, as such a system changes the subject by postulating a merely relative role for spontaneity. The constitutive role of spontaneity prevents the initial mapping of folk psychological states onto functional states before the issue of physical realization arises.<sup>50</sup> Thus, while consciousness has a role that cannot be fully demystified, it need not figure as an inexplicable mystery either. There is much to be said about phenomenal consciousness and Kant has, it seems to me, already said much of it.<sup>51</sup>

In conclusion, I have attempted in this paper significantly to amend the most plausible presentation of a Neo-Kantian approach to consciousness and mentality in the direction of making the presentation more, rather than less, Kantian. I have also sought to present a Kantian account of the nature of consciousness which is both phenomenologically plausible and able to cast light on the contemporary debate between higher order theories of consciousness and the view of consciousness as inherently reflective.

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## NOTES

<sup>1</sup> McDowell (1994a)

<sup>2</sup> References are to Kant (1929).

<sup>3</sup> Presented centrally by Bird (1962), Prauss (1974) and Allison (1983).

<sup>4</sup> Representative papers are Rosenthal (1986), (1993); Mellor (1977–8).

<sup>5</sup> In addition to McDowell (1994a) there is relevant material in McDowell (1985a), (1985b), (1989), (1991), (1992), (1994b), (1995).

<sup>6</sup> Bird (1996a). I shall also be making reference to a companion piece, Bird (1996b). The latter is a response to a paper by Susan Hurley which I shall also be discussing at length, in which she argues that Kant's account of apperception commits the 'humuncular fallacy': Hurley (1994). Hurley further replies to Bird in Hurley (1996). I would say that my overall conception of McDowell's project is more sympathetic to it than Bird's criticisms suggest. The impression I take from Bird's papers is that once the errors about Kant are removed from McDowell's work, there is little left worthy of reconstruction. See Bird (1996a: 220). On the contrary, I believe that with a 'formal' as opposed to a 'material' reading of idealism deployed in *Mind and World*, the overall result is a very welcome re-statement of the importance and relevance of Kant's work to contemporary metaphysics and the philosophy of mind.

<sup>7</sup> My only further comment on this point is that McDowell's 'Hegelianism', ably expounded by (Sedgwick 1997), seems to be motivated by interpreting Kant as holding an

indefensible 'two worlds' version of transcendental idealism and by interpreting Hegel as holding a formal 'two aspects' version of idealism (McDowell 1994: 9, 41, 78, 96–7) (Sedgwick 1997: 23–25). This seems to me to involve considerable exercise of interpretative charity in Hegel's case and none whatsoever in Kant's case. See, for example, Sedgwick's discussion of Hegel on intuitive intellect which can only provide a limited defence of this important Hegelian commitment (Sedgwick 1997: 28–9). If Sedgwick is correct in her diagnosis, McDowell has repeated Hegel's mistake of taking Kant's view to be that the contributions of spontaneity and receptivity are 'isolable' within a 'two worlds' form of idealism (Sedgwick 1997: 33). That this claim of isolability can be rebutted by an analogy with the intuitive intellect as Sedgwick claims (Sedgwick 1997: 33) is not only philosophically dubious, but quite unnecessary in the first place as Sedgwick herself seems to concede (Sedgwick 1997: 34–5). If Bird and I are right this motivation for McDowell's 'Hegelianism' is misguided.

<sup>8</sup> Citing Brandom (1979). I have had the opportunity to discuss Brandom's account of concepts in a review of Brandom (1994) in Thomas (1996b).

<sup>9</sup> Putnam (1994: 493, footnote 17).

<sup>10</sup> It is, of course, quite a different matter to claim that Kant himself saw that his account of mentality offered an account of consciousness which could be developed into a more generous construal of the place of mindedness in nature. That claim would be false, as Kant may have held as extreme a view of animal consciousness as McDowell, although the interpretative point is controversial. But if consciousness is not self-consciousness, and concept use can be normative without involving fully fledged critical reflection, then neither Kant nor McDowell is forced to hold this view. Indeed, Kant himself may have come to realize this. See Ameriks (1982: 245, and especially footnote 25 on 295).

<sup>11</sup> Pippin (1987), an excellent paper to which I am deeply indebted. The primary focus of this paper is on contesting 'cognitive science' reconstructions of Kant's view of the mind. Pippin's thesis is a counter to the recent work of Kitcher (1990) and some of Andrew Brook's reconstructions of Kant's views in Brook (1994). [This general line of interpretation goes back to Sellars (1974)]. In addition to these aspects of Brook's book that I am not in sympathy with, there is a great deal I have learnt from; Brook takes apperceptive self-awareness very seriously and offers a careful analysis of the concept in chapters 3 and 4. If, in the end, I have preferred Pippin's readings of the text to Brook's in many places, I have benefited from the clarity of Brook's approach to the different forms of awareness in Kant's theory of the mind. For further support for Pippin's line on the problems absolute spontaneity poses for the Sellarsian interpretation, see Allison (1996).

<sup>12</sup> Pippin sets out the theses in a neat summary: '(1) We do not know what thoughts or selves are "in themselves"; for all we know, they could, in themselves, be either material or immaterial, or neither (The Noumenal Ignorance Thesis); (2) as empirical events, thoughts or subjects of thoughts are known like all empirical events, as "phenomena"; in this case, the events are primarily contents of inner sense, in time but not in space, and like all alterations, they take place in conformity with the law of cause and effect. Thus, empirically, a dualism of material and mental is true (The Empirical Dualism Thesis); or (3) transcendentially, thoughts and the subjects of thoughts are mischaracterised if thought to raise any metaphysical problems. They are just "formal conditions for the possibility of experience"; e.g. the logical subject of experience is just "that which experiences and should not be construed as a type of being (the Metaphysical Neutrality Thesis)"' Pippin (1987: 450).

<sup>13</sup> Pippin (1987: 459).

<sup>14</sup> For the former, see 'Identity and Objectivity' in Henrich (1994); for the latter, Strawson (1966).

<sup>15</sup> My views on this have changed since Thomas (1996a) where I endorsed Paul Guyer's objections to Henrich's interpretation of the 'Deduction'. In personal correspondence Henrich pointed out to me that his interpretation of the 'Deduction' takes it not directly to involve temporality and his argument that we have 'Cartesian certainty' of the numerical identity of the 'I think:' does not extend to the claim that we have Cartesian certainty of our own diachronic identity. We temporally embedded creatures thus certainly face a lacuna in the argument of the Deduction which gives a role to the 'Analogies', but the 'Deduction' argument does not commit the error that Guyer and others have alleged.

<sup>16</sup> Pippin cites as representative passages B75=A51, B93=A68, B574-5=A546-7, B429. The equivalence of spontaneity to pure apperception is asserted at B132, further at B134n. I should add that given the aim of this paper to relate Kant's views to contemporary work I have not engaged in textual analysis of the *Critique*, which would for the most part simply reproduce Pippin's citations.

<sup>17</sup> I intend the metaphor of 'thinking through' to register two points. The first is the phenomenological point I discuss below, but the second is the point that in thinking 'that p', this content does not 'fall short' of the fact that makes it true, an intuition interestingly developed by McDowell in his account of the 'identity theory' of truth (McDowell 1994: 27). For some further comment and qualifications see Hornsby (1997).

<sup>18</sup> Pippin (1987: 460).

<sup>19</sup> Pippin (1987: 461-2).

<sup>20</sup> Pippin (1987: 463).

<sup>21</sup> Hurley (1994: 141-3); Bermudez (1994: 217). Graham Bird pointed out to me that both arguments and the 'just more content' argument I will discuss below take Kant to have been addressing himself to a sceptical concern about the unity of the self, part of a wider Strawsonian commitment to viewing Kant's work as essentially anti-sceptical. I agree with Bird that Kant's aims are better viewed as descriptive cum phenomenological, but I cannot develop this argument here. A minor oddity of McDowell's position is his combination of a Strawsonian reading of Kant with an insouciance towards the challenge of philosophical scepticism; why accept Strawson's view without its central motivation?

<sup>22</sup> This point seems to suggest an intrinsic connection between consciousness and intentionality, a matter of controversy in the contemporary literature. For an argument for this connection, see Searle (1994: 175-194). For an argument against, see Nelkin (1993) and the further discussion in Nelkin (1996).

<sup>23</sup> Pippin has explained how this poses problems for the 'relative spontaneity' interpretation Sellars offered and which opened up the field for others to construe Kant as a proto-functionalists or cognitive scientist. There is an absolute, not relative, spontaneity in apperception such that even if a relatively spontaneous sequence of mental events is set in train by foreign causes, it must be known to a subject *as* caused in a way which is independent of the phenomenal. Pippin (1987: 467-468). See the further references to this contested issue in footnote 12.

<sup>24</sup> McDowell (1992: 44).

<sup>25</sup> I take the phrase 'primitively compelling' from Peacocke (1992).

<sup>26</sup> McDowell (1989: 300-301).

<sup>27</sup> I borrow the useful phrase 'quasi-inferentialist' from Wright (1996) who explains it as follows: 'McDowell proceeds as though . . . experience has to take over something *akin* to the role played by belief in inferential cases: that non-inferential justification differs from inferential only in that the justifier is not a belief but some other content bearing state. Call this the *quasi-inferential* conception of empirical justification'.

<sup>28</sup> Pippin (1987: 460).

<sup>29</sup> Although, as Dermot Moran reminded me, animal consciousness is really a side issue here. The point is that McDowell's account of concept possession is too demanding even for human concept users.

<sup>30</sup> Searle (1994: 143).

<sup>31</sup> McDowell (1994b).

<sup>32</sup> The paper to which McDowell is responding is Dennett (1978).

<sup>33</sup> Bilgrami (1994).

<sup>34</sup> Pippin (1987: 471).

<sup>35</sup> Brook (1994: 70–94, 246–259). I disagree with Brook's further claim that we are given the subject qua noumenon.

<sup>36</sup> Hurley (1994).

<sup>37</sup> Hurley (1994: 144–145). For some very pertinent comments, see Graham Bird once again in Bird (1996b).

<sup>38</sup> See Williams (1978: 95–101).

<sup>39</sup> Hurley (1994: 150), referring to Walker (1978: 132–34). For important and in my view convincing criticisms of Walker on this point see Ameriks (1982: 287–290).

<sup>40</sup> McDowell (1994: 101).

<sup>41</sup> I owe this suggestion to Adrian Moore. See, for example, Moore (1987). Moore would not be happy with the use this suggestion is put to in the text, as he does not believe in truths that cannot be expressed, but only 'shown'. This is central to the arguments of Moore (1997). My (limited) defence would be that the kind of inexpressibility I am appealing to is relativized to a standpoint: that of the standpoint of consciousness. The suggestion that the transcendental unity of apperception is best explained via the saying/showing distinction is also made by Jonathan Lear in Lear (1984). See also Lear (1985), (1986), (1989). Moore discusses transcendental idealism at length in Moore (1997).

<sup>42</sup> Bird points this out in his discussion of McDowell on 'abstraction' and selfhood, Bird (1996a: 230).

<sup>43</sup> McDowell has two further charges: that Kant could not begin with a merely formal notion of the 'I think:' and recover the idea of an embodied ego and that the link between temporality and the a priori in this connection is particularly damning. McDowell's objections to Kant on a priority are dealt with by Bird (1996a: 230–231).

<sup>44</sup> Thus the kind of research on embodied subjectivity represented by the work of John Campbell, in his admirable (1995) for example, does not directly flow from the argument of the 'Deduction' alone. (Campbell himself does not claim that it does do so.)

<sup>45</sup> This also marks the crucial difference between the Kantian theory I have presented here and the dominant *non-reductive* theory of consciousness held variously by Nagel, Searle, McGinn and Natsoulas, which in Norton Nelkin's words 'is the hypothesis that there exists a self-reflective state that is noncomposite and indivisible, which somehow incorporates all the various features [of consciousness]'. Limitations of space prevent my discussing this view in the required detail here; I concentrate instead on a more focused proposal linking intrinsic reflectiveness and consciousness. For an excellent discussion of this view and its problems, plus further bibliographic references, see Nelkin (1996). Nelkin's theory seems to me deeply Kantian in inspiration and even invokes the concept of apperception, although in a form that ultimately makes Nelkin's position a (subtle) version of the 'higher order' theory.

<sup>46</sup> Eilan (1995: 60).

<sup>47</sup> McDowell's account of object dependent singular thoughts explains how the space of reasons can impinge on the objective via singular reference in such a way that objects can both figure in the realm of Fregean sense and not break the boundaries of the conceptual,

see (McDowell 1994a: 104–107). Eilan comments that Evans' proposal that the use of the first person pronoun is 'object dependent' is 'an attempt to leap over this chasm [between your detached representation of yourself as an object, and your representationally silent occurrence as an extended point of view]', Eilan (1995: 63), text in brackets interpolated. But her grounds for this are that Evans sees such self reference as 'detached, substantial self knowledge weighted down by the object one is', Eilan (1995: 63). Apperceptive consciousness would not have such a commitment and should be less objectionable on these grounds.

<sup>48</sup> The latter is based on the temporal phenomenology of consciousness. This is another point at which this post-Strawsonian research project seems to be recovering the insights of the phenomenological tradition, centrally Husserl and Merleau-Ponty.

<sup>49</sup> This would explain several aspects of subconscious beliefs; their lack of responsiveness to rational governance such as non-contradiction and their explanation via the 'mere physiology' of their associations; the way in which they represent a more 'archaic' form of mental functioning and the respects in which vehicle and content merge in subconscious representations. For a view of the subconscious along these lines see Lear (1992).

<sup>50</sup> McDowell (1985a).

<sup>51</sup> This paper has been revised from a conference paper presented to the U.K. Kant Society in September 1996. Kathryn Brown and Adrian Moore both gave me a great deal of help with the original version of this paper. I have subsequently benefited from comments at the conference and after it from Graham Bird, Dermot Moran and Bob Hanna. A subsequent version was presented to my colleagues at King's at a Departmental Seminar and I am grateful to them all for their comments; David Papineau and Gabriel Segal were particularly helpful. Finally, I would like to thank the anonymous referee for this journal for his or her comments.

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